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COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE U.S FTAs WITH  
CENTRAL AMERICA, AUSTRALIA, AND MOROCCO 
 
Drusilla K. Brown, Tufts University 
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We use the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the economic effects of the 
U.S. bilateral FTAs negotiated with Central America, Australia, and Morocco.  The model covers 
18 economic sectors in each of 22 countries/regions and is based on Version 5.4 of the GTAP 
database for 1997 together with specially constructed estimates of services barriers and other data 
on sectoral employment and numbers of firms.  The distinguishing feature of the model is that it 
incorporates imperfect competition in the manufacturing and services sectors, including 
monopolistic competition, increasing returns and product variety.  The modeling focus is on the 
effects of the bilateral removal of tariffs on agriculture and manufactures and services barriers.  
Rules of origin and other restrictive measures and the non-trade aspects of the FTAs are not taken 
into account due to data constraints.  The computational results indicate that the benefits of 
bilateral FTAs for the United States and partner countries are rather small in both absolute and 
relative terms, and that far greater benefits could be realized if the United States and its FTA 
partners adopted unilateral free trade and especially if multilateral free trade was adopted by all 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a computational analysis of the economic effects of the U.S. bilateral 
free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated with Central America (CAFTA), Australia, and 
Morocco.  The CAFTA was concluded in December 2003, and the FTAs with Australia in 
February 2004 and with Morocco in March 2004.  The Australia and Morocco FTAs were signed 
and approved by the U.S. Congress in 2004, and the CAFTA will be considered for approval 
sometime in 2005.  The analysis of the individual U.S. FTAs is based on the Michigan Model of 
World Production and Trade.  This is a multi-country/multi-sectoral computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the global trading system that has been used for over three decades 
to analyze the economic effects of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade negotiations and a 
variety of other changes in trade and related policies. 
In Section 2 following, we present a brief description of the main features and data of the 
Michigan Model.  In Sections 3-5, we provide some background information on the individual 
FTAs together with presentation of the modeling results of the potential effects of these FTAs on 
the economic welfare, trade, output, and employment for the United States and FTA partner 
countries.  In Section 6, we provide a broader perspective on the FTAs that takes into account the 
effects of the unilateral removal of trade barriers by the United States and its FTA partner 
countries, and the effects of global free trade in which all countries/regions covered in the model 
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are assumed to remove their existing trade barriers on a multilateral basis.  Section 7 contains a 
summary and concluding remarks. 
2. THE MICHIGAN MODEL OF WORLD PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
a. Overview of the Michigan Model 
The version of the Michigan Model that we use in this paper covers 18 economic sectors, 
including agriculture, manufactures, and services, in each of 22 countries/regions. The 
distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that it incorporates some aspects of trade with 
imperfect competition, including monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, and product 
variety.  Some details follow.
1  A more complete description of the formal structure and equations 
of the model can be found on line at www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/. 
  (i) Sectors and market structure 
As mentioned, the version of the model to be used here consists of 18 production sectors and 22 
countries/regions (plus rest-of-world).  The sectoral and country/region coverage are indicated in 
the tables below.  Agriculture is modeled as perfectly competitive with product differentiation by 
country of origin, and the manufactures and services sectors are modeled as monopolistically 
competitive.  Each monopolistically competitive firm produces a differentiated product and sets 
price as a profit-maximizing mark-up of price over marginal cost.  Free entry and exit of firms then 
guarantees zero profits. 
 (ii)  Expenditure 
Consumers and producers are assumed to use a two-stage procedure to allocate expenditure across 
differentiated products. In the first stage, expenditure is allocated across goods without regard to the 
country of origin or producing firm. At this stage, the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, and the 
production function requires intermediate inputs in fixed proportions. In the second stage, 
                                                 
1 See also Deardorff and Stern (1990, esp. pp. 9-46) and Brown and Stern (1989a,b).   3
expenditure on monopolistically competitive goods is allocated across the competing varieties 
supplied by each firm from all countries. In the perfectly competitive agricultural sector, since 
individual firm supply is indeterminate, expenditure is allocated over each country’s industry as a 
whole, with imperfect substitution between products of different countries. 
  The aggregation function in the second stage is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
function.  Use of the CES function and product differentiation by firm imply that consumer welfare 
is influenced both by any reduction in real prices brought about by trade liberalization, as well as 
increased product variety.  The elasticity of substitution among different varieties of a good is 
assumed to be three, a value that is broadly consistent with available empirical estimates.  The 
parameter for the sensitivity of consumers to the number of product varieties is set at 0.5
2 
 (iii)  Production 
The production function is separated into two stages. In the first stage, intermediate inputs and a 
primary composite of capital and labor are used in fixed proportion to output.
3  In the second stage, 
capital and labor are combined through a CES function to form the primary composite. In the 
monopolistically competitive sectors, additional fixed inputs of capital and labor are required. It is 
assumed that fixed capital and fixed labor are used in the same proportion as variable capital and 
variable labor so that production functions are homothetic.  The elasticities of substitution between 
capital and labor vary across sectors and were derived from a literature search of empirical 
estimates of sectoral supply elasticities.  Economies of scale are determined endogenously in the 
model. 
                                                 
2 If the variety parameter is greater than 0.5, it means that consumers value variety more.  If the parameter 
is zero, consumers have no preference for variety.  This is the same as the Armington assumption according 
to which consumers view products as distinguished by country of production.  Sensitivity tests of 
alternative parameter values are included in an appendix below. 
3 Intermediate inputs include both domestic and imported varieties.   4
  (iv) Supply prices  
To determine equilibrium prices, perfectly competitive firms operate such that price is equal to 
marginal cost, while monopolistically competitive firms maximize profits by setting price as an 
optimal mark-up over marginal cost. The numbers of firms in sectors under monopolistic 
competition are determined by the zero profits condition.  The free entry condition in this context is 
also the basic mechanism through which new product varieties are created (or eliminated).  Each of 
the  new entrants arrives with a distinctly different product, expanding the array of goods available 
to consumers. 
  Free entry and exit are also the means through which countries are able to realize the 
specialization gains from trade.  In this connection, it can be noted that in a model with nationally 
differentiated products, which relies on the Armington assumption, production of a particular 
variety of a good cannot move from one country to another.  In such a model, there are gains from 
exchange but no gains from specialization.  The Dixit-Stiglitz framework that we use in the 
Michigan Model allows additionally for a specialization gain,
4 realization of economies of scale, 
and increased product variety. 
  (v) Capital and labor markets 
Capital and labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors within each country. Returns to 
capital and labor are determined so as to equate factor demand to an exogenous supply of each 
factor. The aggregate supplies of capital and labor in each country are assumed to remain fixed so 
                                                 
4 That is, in the Michigan Model with differentiated products supplied by monopolistically competitive 
firms, production of a particular variety is internationally mobile.  A decline in the number of firms in one 
country paired with an expansion in another essentially implies that production of one variety of a good is 
being relocated from the country in which the number of firms is declining to the country in which the number 
of firms is expanding.   
     The international relocation of a particular variety of a good can be understood in the context of the 
ongoing outsourcing debate.  Domestic firms require intermediate inputs, in addition to capital and labor.  To 
the extent that  tariff reduction leads a firm to substitute toward traded intermediate inputs, domestic firms can 
be thought of as outsourcing some component of production.  This is particularly the case if there is a decline 
in the number of domestic firms in the sector from which intermediate inputs are purchased and an expansion 
in the supplier country.   5
as to abstract from macroeconomic considerations (e.g., the determination of investment), since our 
microeconomic focus is on the intersectoral allocation of resources. 
  (vi) World market and trade balance 
The world market determines equilibrium prices such that all markets clear.  Total demand for each 
firm or sector’s product must equal total supply of that product. It is also assumed that trade remains 
balanced for each country/region, that is, any initial trade imbalance remains constant as trade 
barriers are changed. This is accomplished by permitting aggregate expenditure to adjust to 
maintain a constant trade balance.  Thus, we abstract away from the macroeconomic forces and 
policies that are the main determinants of trade imbalances.  Further, it should be noted that there 
are no nominal rigidities in the model.  As a consequence, there is no role for a real exchange rate 
mechanism. 
  (vii) Trade policies and rent/revenues 
We have incorporated into the model the import tariff rates and export taxes/subsidies as policy 
inputs that are applicable to the bilateral trade of the various countries/regions with respect to one 
another.  These have been computed using the ‘GTAP–5.4 Database’ provided in Dimaranan and 
McDougall (2002). The export barriers have been estimated as export-tax equivalents.  We 
assume that revenues from both import tariffs and export taxes, as well as rents from NTBs on 
exports, are redistributed to consumers in the tariff- or tax-levying country and are spent like any 
other income. 
  Tariff liberalization can affect economic efficiency through three main channels.  First, in 
the context of standard trade theory, tariff reductions both reduce the cost of imports for consumers 
and for producers purchasing traded intermediate inputs, thus producing an exchange gain.  Second, 
tariff removal leads firms to direct resources toward those sectors in which the product varieties are 
expanded by firms in response to the changes occurring on the world market.  That is, we have the 
standard  specialization gain.  Third, tariff reductions have a pro-competitive effect on sellers.     6
Increased price pressures from imported varieties force incumbent firms to cut price.  Surviving 
firms remain viable by expanding output, thereby moving down their average total cost (ATC) 
curve. The consequent lower ATC of production creates gains from the realization of economies of 
scale. 
  (viii) Model closure and implementation 
We assume in the model that aggregate expenditure varies endogenously to hold aggregate 
employment constant.  This closure is analogous to the Johansen closure rule (Deardorff and Stern, 
1990, pp. 27-29). The Johansen closure rule consists of keeping the requirement of full employment 
while dropping the consumption function. This means that consumption can be thought of as 
adjusting endogenously to ensure full employment. However, in the Michigan Model, we do not 
distinguish consumption from other sources of final demand. That is, we assume instead that total 
expenditure adjusts to maintain full employment. 
  The model is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). When policy 
changes are introduced into the model, the method of solution yields percentage changes in sectoral 
employment and certain other variables of interest. Multiplying the percentage changes by the 
absolute levels of the pertinent variables in the database yields the absolute changes, positive or 
negative, which might result from the various liberalization scenarios. 
  (ix) Interpreting the modeling results 
To help the reader interpret the modeling results, it is useful to review the features of the model 
that serve to identify the various economic effects to be reflected in the different applications of 
the model.  Although the model includes the aforementioned features of imperfect competition, it 
remains the case that markets respond to trade liberalization in much the same way that they 
would with perfect competition.  That is, when tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced in a 
sector, domestic buyers (both final and intermediate) substitute towards imports and the domestic 
competing industry contracts production while foreign exporters expand.  Thus, in the case of   7
multilateral liberalization that reduces tariffs and other trade barriers simultaneously in most 
sectors and countries, each country’s industries share in both of these effects, expanding or 
contracting depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or less than in other 
sectors and countries.   
  Worldwide, these changes cause increased international demand for all sectors.  World 
prices increase most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most.
5  This in turn causes 
changes in countries’ terms of trade that can be positive or negative.  Those countries that are net 
exporters of goods with the greatest degree of liberalization will experience increases in their 
terms of trade, as the world prices of their exports rise relative to their imports.  The reverse 
occurs for net exporters in industries where liberalization is slight – perhaps because it may 
already have taken place in previous trade rounds. 
  The effects on the welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-of-trade 
effects, together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from additional benefits 
due to the realization of economies of scale.  Thus, we expect on average that the world will gain 
from multilateral liberalization, as resources are reallocated to those sectors in each country 
where there is a comparative advantage. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency 
gains should raise national welfare measured by the equivalent variation for every country,
6 
although some factor owners within a country may lose, as will be noted below.  However, it is 
possible for a particular country whose net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest 
liberalization to lose overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade swamps these efficiency gains. 
  On the other hand, although trade with imperfect competition is perhaps best known for 
introducing reasons why countries may lose from trade, actually its greatest contribution is to 
                                                 
5 The price of agricultural products supplied by the rest of the world is taken as the  numeraire in the model, 
and there is a rest-of-world against which all other prices can rise. 
6 The equivalent variation is a measure of the amount of income that would have to be given or taken away 
from an economy before a change in policy in order to leave the economy as well off as it would be after 
the policy change has taken place.  If the equivalent variation is positive, it is indicative of an improvement 
in economic welfare resulting from the policy change.   8
expand the list of reasons for gains from trade.  Thus, in the Michigan Model,  trade liberalization 
permits all countries to expand their export sectors at the same time that all sectors compete more 
closely with a larger number of competing varieties from abroad.  As a result, countries as a 
whole gain from lower costs due to increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions due to 
greater competition, and reduced costs and/or increased utility due to greater product variety.  All 
of these effects make it more likely that countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are 
shared across the entire population.
7 
  The various effects just described in the context of multilateral trade liberalization will 
also take place when there is unilateral trade liberalization, although these effects will depend on 
the magnitudes of the liberalization in relation to the patterns of trade and the price and output 
responses involved between the liberalizing country and its trading partners.  Similarly, many of 
the effects described will take place with the formation of bilateral or regional FTAs.  But in these 
cases, there may be trade creation and positive effects on the economic welfare of FTA-member 
countries together with trade diversion and negative effects on the economic welfare of non-
member countries.  The net effects on economic welfare for individual countries and globally will 
thus depend on the economic circumstances and policy changes implemented.
8 
In the real world, all of the various effects occur over time, some of them more quickly 
than others.  However, the Michigan Model is static in the sense that it is based upon a single set 
                                                 
7 In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one expects countries as a 
whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor – the ‘scarce factor’ – to lose through the mechanism 
first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941).  The additional sources of gain from trade due to 
increasing returns to scale, competition, and product variety, however, are shared across factors, and we 
routinely find in our CGE modeling that both labor and capital gain from multilateral trade liberalization.   
8 It may be noted that, in a model with perfect competition, bilateral trade liberalization should have the 
effect of contracting trade with excluded countries, thereby improving the terms of trade for FTA members 
vis-à-vis the rest of world.  But in a model with scale economies, the pro-competitive effect of trade 
liberalization may generate a cut in price and increase in supply to excluded countries.  The terms of trade 
of FTA members could possibly deteriorate in this event.  It should also be mentioned that rules of origin 
may offset some of the potential welfare benefits of FTAs insofar as they may lead to higher input costs 
and consequent reduction of preference margins.  In this connection, see Krishna (2005).   9
of equilibrium conditions rather than relationships that vary over time.
9   The model results 
therefore refer to a time horizon that depends on the assumptions made about which variables do 
and do not adjust to changing market conditions, and on the short- or long-run nature of these 
adjustments.  Because the supply and demand elasticities used in the model reflect relatively 
long-run adjustments and it is assumed that markets for both labor and capital clear within 
countries,
10 the modeling results are appropriate for a relatively long time horizon of several years 
– perhaps two or three at a minimum.  On the other hand, the model does not allow for the very 
long-run adjustments that could occur through capital accumulation, population growth, and 
technological change.  The modeling results should therefore be interpreted as being 
superimposed upon longer-run growth paths of the economies involved.  To the extent that these 
growth paths themselves may be influenced by trade liberalization, therefore, the model does not 
capture such effects.  
b.  Benchmark Data 
Needless to say, the data needs of this model are immense.  Apart from numerous share 
parameters, the model requires various types of elasticity measures.  Like other CGE models, 
most of our data come from published sources.   
  As mentioned above, the main data source used in the model is ‘The GTAP-5.4 Database’ 
of the Purdue University Center for Global Trade Analysis Project (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
                                                 
9 As noted above, macroeconomic closure in the model involves the equivalent of having expenditure equal 
to the sum of earned incomes plus redistributed net tax revenues.  However, the actual solution is attained 
indirectly, but equivalently, by imposing a zero change in the trade balance.  Since the model allows for all 
net tax and tariff revenues to be redistributed to consumers, when tariffs are reduced with trade 
liberalization, the model implicitly imposes a non-distorting tax to recoup the loss in tariff revenues. 
10 The analysis in the model assumes throughout that the aggregate, economy-wide, level of employment is 
held constant in each country.  The effects of trade liberalization are therefore not permitted to change any 
country’s overall rates of employment or unemployment.  This assumption is made because overall 
employment is determined by macroeconomic forces and policies that are not contained in the model and 
would not themselves be included in a negotiated trade agreement.  The focus instead is on the composition 
of employment across sectors as determined by the microeconomic interactions of supply and demand 
resulting from the liberalization of trade.   10
2002).  The reference year for this GTAP database is 1997.  From this source, we have extracted 
the following data, aggregated to our sectors and countries/regions:
11 
•  Bilateral trade flows among 22 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 sectors.  Trade with 
the rest-of-world (ROW) is included to close the model. 
•  Input-output tables for the 22 countries/regions, excluding ROW 
•  Components of final demand along with sectoral contributions for the 22 countries/regions, 
excluding ROW  
•  Gross value of output and value added at the sectoral level for the 22 countries/regions, 
excluding ROW 
•  Bilateral import tariffs by sector among the 22 countries/regions 
•  Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor by sector 
•  Bilateral export-tax equivalents among the 22 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 
sectors 
The monopolistically competitive market structure in the nonagricultural sectors of the 
model imposes an additional data requirement of the numbers of firms at the sectoral level, and 
there is need also for estimates of sectoral employment.
12  The employment data, which have 
been adapted from a variety of published sources, will be noted in tables below. 
  The GTAP-5.4 1997 database has been projected to the year 2005, which is when the 
Uruguay Round liberalization will have been fully implemented.  In this connection, we 
extrapolated the labor availability in different countries/regions by an average weighted 
population growth rate of 1.2 percent per annum.  All other major variables have been projected, 
using an average weighted growth rate of GDP of 2.5 percent.
13   The 2005 data have been 
adjusted to take into account two major developments that have occurred in the global trading 
system since the mid-1990s.  These include:  (1) implementation of the Uruguay Round 
                                                 
11 Details on the sectoral and country/region aggregation are available from the authors on request. 
12 Notes on the construction of the data on the number of firms and for employment are available from the 
authors on request. 
13 The underlying data are drawn from World Bank (2003) sources and are available on request.  For a 
more elaborate and detailed procedure for calculating year 2005 projections, see Hertel and Martin (1999) 
and Hertel (2000).   11
negotiations that were completed in 1993-94 and were to be phased in over the following decade; 
and (2) the accession of Mainland China and Taiwan to the WTO in 2001.
14  We have made 
allowance for the foregoing developments by readjusting the 2005 scaled-up database for 
benchmarking purposes to obtain an approximate picture of what the world may be expected to 
look like in 2005.  In the computational scenarios to be presented below, we use these re-adjusted 
data as the starting point to carry out our liberalization scenarios for the U.S. bilateral FTAs and 
for the accompanying unilateral and global free trade scenarios. 
  The GTAP 5.4 (1997) base data for tariffs and the estimated tariff equivalents of services 
barriers are broken down by sector on a global and bilateral basis in Table 1.
15  The post-Uruguay 
Round tariff rates on agriculture, mining, and manufactures are applied rates and are calculated in 
GTAP by dividing tariff revenues by the value of imports by sector.  For the United States, the 
highest import tariffs for manufactures are recorded for textiles, wearing apparel, and leather 
products & footwear, both globally and bilaterally.  The import tariff rates on manufactures are 
noticeably higher for the CAC and especially for Morocco, while Australia’s manufactures tariffs 
resemble those of the United States.   
                                                 
14 The tariff data for the WTO accession of China and Taiwan have been adapted from Ianchovichina and 
Martin (2004).  In addition to benchmarking the effects of the Uruguay Round and China/Taiwan accession 
to the WTO, Francois et al. (2005) benchmark their GTAP 5.4 dataset to take into account the projected 
enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004 to include ten new member countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe and some changes in the EU Common Agricultural Policies that were introduced in 2000.  
Our EU and EFTA regional aggregate includes the 25-member EU, but the benchmark data were not 
adjusted to take into account the adoption of the EU common external tariffs by the new members.   
Because of data constraints, we have not made allowance for the Information Technology Agreement and 
agreements for liberalization of financial and telecommunications services following conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. 
15  The basic GTAP 5.4 data that are available refer to an aggregate entitled Central America and the 
Caribbean (CAC).  Since these data cannot be broken down for the individual countries in the region, it is 
assumed throughout this paper that the CAC aggregate data can be interpreted as a proxy for the CAFTA 
members that comprise the five Central American countries, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, together with the Dominican Republic.  According to the IMF Direction of 
Trade for 1997-2001, the CAFTA countries plus the Dominican Republic accounted for about two-thirds of 
U.S. exports to the CAC region and around 75% of U.S. imports in the years covered.  These countries also 
accounted for about 57% of the total population and labor forces for the CAC region.  We trust therefore 
that the GTAP 5.4 data can be considered as reasonable proxies for the CAFTA member countries.   12
  The services barriers are based on financial data on average gross (price-cost) margins 
constructed initially by Hoekman (2000) and adapted for modeling purposes in Brown, Deardorff, 
and Stern (2002).  The gross operating margins are calculated as the differences between total 
revenues and total operating costs.  Some of these differences are presumably attributable to fixed 
costs.  Given that the gross operating margins vary across countries, a portion of the margin can 
also be attributed to barriers to FDI.  For this purpose, a benchmark is set for each sector in 
relation to the country with the smallest gross operating margin, on the assumption that 
operations in the benchmark country can be considered to be freely open to foreign firms.  The 
excess in any other country above this lowest benchmark is then taken to be due to barriers to 
establishment by foreign firms.   
  That is, the barrier is modeled as the cost-increase attributable to an increase in fixed cost 
borne by multinational corporations attempting to establish an enterprise locally in a host country.  
This abstracts from the possibility that fixed costs may differ among firms because of variations 
in market size, distance from headquarters, and other factors.  It is further assumed that this cost 
increase can be interpreted as an ad valorem equivalent tariff on services transactions generally.  
It can be seen that the constructed services barriers are considerably higher than the import 
barriers on manufactures.  While possibly subject to overstatement, it is generally acknowledged 
that many services sectors are highly regulated and thus may considerably restrain international 
services transactions.
16 
  The value and shares of U.S. exports and imports for 1997 are broken by sector according 
to destination and origin in Table 2.  Sectoral tariff rates and exports/imports for the FTA partners 
are provided in Table 3.  U.S. exports to the CAC are about 2% of total exports and are 
concentrated in wearing apparel, chemicals, and machinery & equipment, most of which have the 
characteristics of inputs into the production process.  U.S. exports to Australia are less than 2% of 
                                                 
16  As will be noted below, services liberalization in the context of the Michigan Model results in 
significantly larger welfare effects compared to models using the GTAP structure that do not include 
services liberalization or that have smaller magnitudes of the estimated services barriers.   13
total exports, and nearly two-thirds of these exports consist of chemicals, transportation 
equipment, and machinery & equipment.  U.S. exports to Morocco are about 0.1% of total 
exports and are concentrated in agriculture and food, beverages & tobacco, transportation 
equipment, machinery & equipment, and government services.  U.S. imports from the CAC are 
less than 2% of total imports and are comprised primarily of agricultural products, food, 
beverages & tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, and machinery & equipment.  U.S. imports from 
Australia are less than 1% of total imports and are concentrated especially in services, food, 
beverages & tobacco, and metal products.  U.S. imports from Morocco are less than 0.1% of total 
imports and consist to a large extent of services, mining, food, beverages, & tobacco, wearing 
apparel, and machinery & equipment. 
  Employment by sector is indicated in Table 4.  Nearly 80% of U.S. employment is in the 
services sectors and the remainder spread across agriculture and manufacturing.  About 30% of 
employment in the CAC is in agriculture and in food, beverages & tobacco, and nearly 60% in 
services.  In Australia, services account for about 80% of total employment, and agriculture for 
5.1%.  In Morocco, about 68% of total employment is in services, 10% in agriculture and food, 
beverages & tobacco, and nearly 10% in textiles and wearing apparel. 
  An indication of the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment abroad for 2002 is given in 
Table 5.  Detailed data are available only for Australia, which can be seen to account for about 
2.5% of the total U.S. FDI abroad.  Mining accounts for 23%, manufactures are 30%, and 
services are 28% of the total for Australia.  Sectoral details are not given for the CAC and 
Morocco because of disclosure limitations.  As noted in the USTR’s ‘Interim Environmental 
Review’ (2003b, p. 8) for CAFTA, available on the USTR website (www.ustr.gov), U.S. FDI was 
$3.0 billion in the CAFTA member countries in 2001.  According to Belghazi et al. (2002, p. 37), 
the United States was Morocco’s third largest investor (9%), after France (46%) and Portugal 
(10%), based on cumulative data for direct investments and loans combined for the period 1997-
2001.  The U.S. share largely reflects a sizable investment made in the energy and mining sector   14
in 1997.  Services are estimated to account for nearly three-quarters of foreign investment in 
Morocco, with the largest investments having been made in 1999-2001 in telecommunications. 
3. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE U.S.-CAFTA  
a. The Main Features of the CAFTA 
The draft texts of the CAFTA, which are available on the official USTR website (www.ustr.gov), 
contain 22 detailed provisions, three annexes, and side letters.  For our purposes, the main 
features of the CAFTA are summarized succinctly in the USTR Press Release 04-03 (January 25, 
2004), and are as follows:
17 
•  ‘New Opportunities for U.S. Workers and Manufacturers:  More than 80 percent of U.S. 
exports of consumer and industrial goods will become duty-free in Central America 
immediately, with remaining tariffs phased out over 10 years.  Key U.S. export sectors 
will benefit, such as information technology products, agricultural and construction 
equipment, paper products, chemicals, and medical and scientific equipment. 
 
•  Expanded Markets for U.S. Farmers and Ranchers:  More than half of current U.S. farm 
exports to Central America will become duty-free immediately, including high quality 
cuts of beef, cotton, wheat, soybeans, key fruits and vegetables, processed food products, 
and wine, among others.  Tariffs on most remaining U.S. farm products will be phased 
out within 15 years.  U.S. farm products that will benefit from improved market access 
include pork, dry beans, vegetable oil, poultry, rice, corn, and dairy products. 
 
•  Textiles and Apparel:  Textiles and apparel will be duty-free and quota-free immediately 
if they meet the Agreement’s rule of origin, promoting new opportunities for U.S. and 
Central American fiber, yarn, fabric and apparel manufacturing.  The agreement’s 
benefits for textiles and apparel will be retroactive to January 1, 2004.  An unprecedented 
provision will give duty-free benefits to some apparel made in Central America that 
contains certain fabrics from NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada.  This provision 
encourages integration of the North and Central American textile industries, and is a step 
to prepare for an increasingly competitive global market. 
 
•  Access to Services:  The Central American countries will accord substantial market 
access across their entire services regime, offering new access in sectors such as 
telecommunications, express delivery, computer and related services, tourism, energy, 
transport, construction and engineering, financial services, insurance, audio/visual and 
entertainment, professional, environmental, and other sectors.  Central American 
                                                 
17 For more information, see www.ustr.gov, ‘Trade Facts:  Free Trade with Central America:  Summary of 
the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement,’ December 17, 2003.  The Report of the Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations on the CAFTA and draft texts of the CAFTA, including the 
Dominican Republic, are available on the USTR website.  The CAFTA is to be considered for approval by 
the U.S. Congress in 2005.   15
countries have agreed to change dealer protection regimes and loosen restrictions that 
lock U.S. firms into exclusive or inefficient distributor arrangements. 
 
•  A Trade Agreement for the Digital Age:  State-of-the-art protections and non-
discriminatory treatment are provided for digital products such as U.S. software, music, 
text, and videos.  Protection for U.S. patents, trademarks and trade secrets is 
strengthened. 
 
•  Strong Protections for Worker Rights:  Goes beyond Chile and Singapore FTAs to create 
a three-part strategy on worker rights that will ensure effective enforcement of domestic 
labor laws, establish a cooperative program to improve labor laws and enforcement, and 
build the capacity of Central American nations to monitor and enforce labor rights. 
 
•  An Innovative Environment Chapter:  Goes beyond Chile and Singapore FTAs in seeking 
to develop a robust public submissions process to ensure that views of civil society are 
appropriately considered, and for benchmarking of environmental cooperation activities 
and input from international organizations. 
 
•  Strong Protections for U.S. Investors:  The Agreement establishes a secure, predictable 
legal framework for U.S. investors in Central America. 
 
•  Open and Fair Government Procurement:  Provides ground-breaking anti-corruption 
measures in government contracting.  U.S. firms are guaranteed a fair and transparent 
process to sell goods and services to a wide range of Central American government 
entities.’ 
 
In addition to the foregoing, the full CAFTA includes provisions for rules of origin, 
customs administration and trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical 
barriers to trade, trade remedies, transparency, and dispute settlement procedures.  While the 
CAFTA thus reflects a myriad of objectives from the U.S. perspective, there is an evident focus 
on expanding the market access for U.S. goods and services and shaping the regulatory 
environment in the CAFTA member countries to conform to U.S. principles and institutions.  By 
the same token, the CAFTA members may be attracted by the more favorable access that the 
agreement will provide for their exports to the U.S. market and the opportunities to improve their 
economic efficiency and to design and implement more effective domestic institutions and 
development policies. 
We turn now to our computational analysis, which will focus on the economic effects of 
the removal of the trade barriers on agricultural products, manufactures, and services that will be   16
removed as the result of the CAFTA.
18   While, as noted, many barriers are to be removed 
immediately, some barriers will be phased out over longer periods of time.  For modeling 
purposes, however, we assume that all barriers are removed at the same time rather than in 
phases. 
b.  Computational Results of the CAFTA 
The global welfare effects of the bilateral removal of agricultural protection, manufactures tariffs, 
and services barriers are indicated in Table 6a.  It can be seen that there are negligible effects on 
economic welfare with the bilateral removal of agricultural protection.  U.S. economic welfare is 
increased by $3.7 billion with the bilateral elimination of manufactures tariffs and $13.5 billion 
with the bilateral elimination of services barriers.  The total improvement of U.S. economic 
welfare is $17.3 billion, which is 0.17% of U.S. GNP.  Economic welfare in the CAC increases 
by $3.5 billion with the bilateral elimination of manufactures tariffs and $1.8 billion with the 
bilateral elimination of services barriers.  The total improvement in CAC economic welfare is 
$5.3 billion, which is 4.4% of CAC GNP.
19,20  It can also be seen that the CAFTA is apparently 
                                                 
18 In anticipation of the presentation of our computational results, it is of interest to cite Harrison et al. 
(2003), who have summarized the main conclusions that can be drawn from a number of CGE modeling 
studies of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) by themselves and others.  Among their conclusions 
are the following:  (1) countries excluded from a PTA almost always lose; (2) market access is a key 
determinant of the net benefits of a PTA; (3) for Southern countries, North-South PTAs offer a beneficial 
increase in competition in their home markets and involve little increase in the supply price of Northern 
country sales in Southern countries; (4) for some countries, ‘additive  regionalism’ may result in larger 
gains than unilateral trade liberalization; (5) trade liberalization may be pro-poor in developing countries 
but may nonetheless require safety nets for some displaced workers; and (6) dynamic effects are not 
expected to reverse the main conclusions of static modeling. 
19 Andriamananjara and Tsigas (2003) use the standard GTAP model to analyze the welfare effects of 
bilateral U.S. FTAs with 65 countries/regions.  This version of the GTAP model assumes constant returns 
to scale, perfect competition, and product differentiation by country of origin (the so-called Armington 
assumption).  The Armington assumption implies that countries have monopoly power in their trading 
relationships, and that trade liberalization may thus have sizable terms-of-trade effects, depending on the 
structure and pattern of trade.  There is reason to believe accordingly that welfare changes in this version of 
the GTAP model may reflect strong terms-of-trade effects.  This is evident in the results of a U.S.-CAC 
FTA, which is estimated to increase U.S. economic welfare by $1.6 billion (.02% of GDP) and CAC 
welfare by $2.2 billion (2.4% of GDP).  The decomposition of the results by the authors in their Appendix 
Table indicates that a substantial proportion of these welfare changes is due to changes in terms of trade.  
DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) use the standard GTAP model to analyze U.S. bilateral FTAs with 13 
prospective partner countries, and their results similarly suggest the dominance of terms-of-trade effects.  
See ______________ goods tariffs, as well as USITC (2004b) that contains both GTAP economywide and   17
trade diverting to a small extent for most of the non-member countries/regions shown. Thus, for 
example, Japan’s economic welfare declines by $1.4 billion (-0.02% of GNP) and the EU and 
EFTA welfare by $3.4 billion (-0.03% of GNP).  Global economic welfare increases by $15.7 
billion. 
  The sectoral effects on exports, imports, output, and employment are indicated in Table 
6b.  The largest percentage increases in U.S. sectoral exports are in food, beverages & tobacco, 
textiles, wearing apparel, and leather products & footwear.  The largest percentage increases in 
U.S. imports, except for leather products & footwear, are in these same sectors.  For the CAC, 
there are sizable percentage increases in the exports of food, beverages & tobacco, textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products & footwear, and services.  What is striking are the large 
percentage increases in CAC imports in all sectors, which reflects the asymmetry between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
selected sectoral effects for the United States, which are noticeably smaller compared to the results based 
on the Michigan Model.  See also Hilaire and Yang (2002), who use the GTAP model to analyze U.S. 
bilateral FTAs with Chile, CAC, and Australia, concentrating on the removal of goods tariffs.   
          In contrast to GTAP studies, in the Michigan Model, manufactures and services products are 
differentiated by firm, so that countries have much less leverage over their terms of trade.  It should 
furthermore be noted that, while the GTAP framework is structured to take shifts of productive resources 
into account and generates results for effects on real wages and the return to capital, the GTAP framework 
does not permit calculation of shifts in the sectoral employment of workers as is done in the Michigan 
Model. 
20 It should be noted in the computational results that there tend to be larger absolute welfare gains and 
smaller percent changes in welfare for the large countries as compared to the small countries.  In this 
connection, the expectation is that, under conditions of perfect competition, a small country may 
appropriate a large share of the absolute gains from trade liberalization because the prices of the small 
country will tend to move towards the prices in the large country.  Since large price changes give rise to 
large gains from trade, the small country may be expected therefore to realize greater gains from 
liberalization than the large country. 
     But when scale effects are present, as in the Michigan Model, the foregoing distributional logic may not 
hold.  That is, scale gains will be substantial for countries that specialize in sectors with significant 
unrealized scale economies, and it may well be that large countries are in a better position to realize big 
scale gains.  Also, the pro-competitive effects resulting from liberalization may produce efficiency gains 
throughout an industry.  As a consequence, the absolute gain will be proportional to the 
industry’s/country’s size.  With regard to percent changes, however, there is reason to believe that a large 
country will exert stronger pro-competitive forces on a small country, than vice versa.  We might therefore 
expect to observe larger percent changes in scale in small as compared to large countries.  This is borne out 
in our calculations of scale effects for the countries/regions in the various liberalization scenarios that we 
have run, the results of which are available on request. 
     It may be noted, finally, that the relative benefits to the CAC countries may reflect the large shares of 
CAC exports and imports vis-à-vis the United States.   18
significantly higher rates of protection in the CAC as compared to the United States noted in 
Table 1. 
  Gross output is increased in all of the U.S. sectors, except for textiles and wearing 
apparel.  The changes in sectoral outputs are reflected in the employment impacts.  For the United 
States, there are employment declines of 5,133 workers in textiles and 14,006 workers in apparel,  
which are -0.55% and -1.77%, respectively, of initial employment.  There is increased 
employment in practically all of the other U.S. sectors, but the absolute and percent changes are 
small.  The CAFTA will thus have comparatively negligible effects on U.S. sectoral output and 
employment. 
In the CAC, there are sizable percentage increases in output in textiles, wearing apparel, 
and leather products & footwear.  These are sectors in which the CAC countries can be presumed 
to have a comparative advantage.  Employment increases by 53,741 workers in textiles, 230,663 
workers in wearing apparel, and 9,518 workers in leather products & footwear.  The percentage 
increases in employment in these sectors are 28%, 42%, and 15%, respectively.  It is noteworthy 
that there are employment declines in all of the other sectors, as the expansion of the relatively 
labor-intensive industries attracts workers from the rest of the economy.  These employment 
reallocations are apparently quite substantial and suggest that the CAFTA may result in 
significant worker displacement in the process of adjustment brought about by elimination of the 
import barriers. 
Changes in bilateral trade flows associated with the CAFTA are indicated in Table 6c.  It 
can be seen that U.S. exports to the CAC aggregate increase by $8.1 billion and U.S. imports 
increase by $9.8 billion.  There are pervasive indications of trade diversion as shown by the 
reductions in the bilateral trade flows involving many of the other countries/regions.  
Our modeling results in Tables 6a-6c reflect the bilateral elimination of barriers to trade 
in agricultural products, manufactures, and services.  As noted in the summary of the main 
features of the CAFTA, there are a number of non-trade issues that are covered as well.  No   19
allowance has been made for these non-trade benefits, although the relatively small size of the 
benefits calculated from bilateral free trade suggests that the non-trade benefits are likely also to 
be fairly small.  No account has been taken of possible increases in U.S. foreign direct investment 
in the CAFTA members in response to the incentives provided by the bilateral liberalization, and 
no allowance has been made for possible increases in capital formation and economic growth and 
improvements in productivity in the United States and the CAFTA countries.  Our modeling 
results may thus constitute a lower bound to the welfare changes due to the CAFTA bilateral 
liberalization.  But it remains unclear how significant the non-trade and growth effects of the 
CAFTA may be, and there may still remain issues of trade diversion.. 
4. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA FTA 
a.  The Main Features of the U.S.-Australia FTA 
The negotiation of the U.S.-Australia FTA was completed in February 2004.  It was approved by 
the U.S. Congress later in the year and takes effect on January 1, 2005.  As noted above, a 
common framework is used for all of the bilateral FTAs being negotiated by the United States 
along the same lines as in our description of the main features of the CAFTA.  This is evident 
from the November 13, 2002 text, reproduced on the USTR website, of the ‘Notification Letters 
to Congressional Leaders’ sent from USTR Robert B. Zoellick notifying the intention to initiate 
negotiations for an FTA with Australia.  Of course, the details for particular FTA negotiations 
will vary depending on the partner country and the U.S. interests.
21 
  In the case of the U.S.-Australia FTA, according to the aforementioned ‘Notification 
Letters’ (pp. 1-2), the primary U.S. objectives are as follows: 
•  ‘The increased access to Australia’s market that an FTA would provide would further 
boost trade in both goods and services, enhancing employment opportunities in both 
                                                 
21 See USTR, ‘Trade Facts:  Free Trade ‘Down Under’,’ Press Release 04-08, The Report of the Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, and the draft texts of the FTA, all of which are available on 
the USTR website (www.ustr.gov).    20
countries.  An FTA also would encourage additional foreign investment between the 
United States and Australia, adding to the many jobs that the significant investment flows 
between the two countries currently support.  In addition, an FTA would result in greater 
business integration, especially in the information technology sector, increasing 
efficiency and the competitiveness of U.S. industry. 
•  …an FTA with Australia is of particular interest and concern to the U.S. agriculture 
community.  Making progress on a number of issues of concern to U.S. agriculture will 
be essential for the successful conclusion of these negotiations.  In this regard, we will 
work hard to facilitate the export of U.S. food and agricultural products to the Australian 
market and to address the full range of issues facing U.S. agriculture exports.  As an 
example, several U.S. agricultural interests have raised serious concerns about Australia’s 
use of phytosanitary (SPS) measures as a means of restricting trade. 
•  …We will also seek improved market access through eliminating high tariffs on 
industrial goods of export interest to the United States.  …we will also seek to improve 
protection of intellectual property rights in Australia, eliminate restrictions that make it 
difficult for U.S. service providers to operate in the Australian market, and address other 
barriers to U.S. goods and services. 
•  …FTA negotiations with Australia will further deepen the already close cooperation 
between the United States and Australia in advancing our objectives for the multilateral 
negotiations currently underway in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  …FTA 
negotiations will provide the opportunity for even closer cooperation in the WTO 
agriculture negotiations in particular. 
•  …In addition to complementing our partnership with Australia on global and Asia-
Pacific trade issues, an FTA would also further deepen the ties between our societies and 
strengthen the foundation of our security alliance.  We are already partners in the areas of 
intelligence, military inter-operability, command-and-control, and security planning.  An 
FTA would facilitate the building of new networks that enhance our Pacific democracies’ 
mutual interests, shared experiences, and promotion of common values so that we can 
work together more effectively with third countries.’ 
In the course of negotiating the U.S.-Australia FTA, there was considerable debate in 
Australia about the advantages and limitations of the FTA from the Australian perspective as well 
as some CGE modeling studies of the effects of the FTA.
22  Much of the opposition to the FTA 
stemmed from the concerns that it may undermine Australia’s traditional reliance on the pursuit 
of the benefits from multilateral liberalization in the WTO framework, the preferential 
arrangements may be welfare reducing for Australia and non-member countries, Australian 
consumers might face higher pharmaceutical prices, and Australia’s security interests may be 
                                                 
22 Some pertinent references, which were provided by Philippa Dee, include:  ACIL Consulting (2003); 
Berkelmans et al. (2001); Bhagwati and Garnaut (2003); Centre for International Economics (2003); Centre 
for Policy Studies (2003); Cutbush (2003); Garnaut (2003a,b,c,d,e); and Kasper (2002).  See also Stoler 
(2003).   21
compromised rather than enhanced by closer bilateral relations with the United States.  In any 
event, we turn now to a presentation and discussion of our modeling results for the U.S.-Australia 
FTA. 
b.  Computational Results of the U.S.-Australia FTA 
The global welfare effects of the bilateral removal of U.S.-Australia agricultural protection, 
manufactures tariffs, and services barriers are indicated in Table 7a.  It can be seen that there are 
negligible effects from the bilateral removal of agricultural protection.  The removal of 
manufactures tariffs increases U.S. welfare by $2.6 billion (0.03% of GNP) and Australia’s 
welfare by $0.5 billion (0.10%).  The largest welfare increases come from services liberalization, 
with an increase in U.S. welfare of $16.8 billion (0.17% of GNP) and an increase in Australia’s 
welfare of $4.9 billion (0.98%).  The total welfare increases are $19.4 billion (0.20% of GNP) for 
the United States and $5.4 billion (1.1% of GNP) for Australia.
23  There are many instances of 
trade diversion for non-partner countries, although the absolute and percentage changes are small.  
Global economic welfare rises by $23.1 billion. 
                                                 
23 Andriamananjara and Tsigas (2003, p. 15) estimate that a U.S.-Australia FTA will increase Australia’s 
economic welfare by $44 million (.01% of GDP) and U.S. welfare by $396 million (.005% of GDP).  The 
terms-of-trade changes dominate these results, which, in any case, are considerably lower than those based 
on the Michigan Model just noted. 
     There are a number of other CGE modeling studies that have focused explicitly on the Australia-U.S. 
FTA.  Using a modified version of the standard version of the GTAP model with some dynamic features 
and a variety of additional data inputs adapted for Australia, the Centre for Policy Studies (2003) estimates 
that Australian GDP will increase in the long run by 0.17% and U.S.GDP will increase by 0.004%.  The 
Centre for International Economics (2001) uses both the standard GTAP model and the dynamic APG-
Cubed model.  The GTAP estimates (p. 35) indicate an increase in real GDP of 0.34% for Australia and 
0.02% for the United States, as compared to increases of 1.1% and 0.2%, respectively, in the results based 
on the Michigan Model.  The net present value of the increase in real GDP (1999 dollars) between 2000 
and 2020 (p. 25), using the APG-Cubed dynamic model, is $15.5 billion for Australia and $16.9 billion for 
the United States.  These results suggest that the long-run gains from the Australia-U.S. FTA are greater 
than the results based on the static model.  ACIL Consulting (2003) has used the standard GTAP model 
with some data modifications and assumptions about the phasing of the Australia-U.S. FTA. They conclude 
that Australia will be worse off with the FTA, experiencing a decline of 0.09% in real GNP between 2005 
and 2010.  This result has been challenged in a CIE (2003) comment that points out some contradictions, 
mistakes, and misrepresentations in the ACIL study.  Hilaire and Yang (2003) use the GTAP model to 
analyze the bilateral removal of U.S.-Australia goods tariffs.  They find that U.S. welfare rises to a small 
extent while Australian and global welfare decline.  USITC (2004a) presents GTAP economywide and 
selected sectoral effects for the United States, which are considerably smaller than the results based on the 
Michigan Model.   22
  The sectoral effects are shown in Table 7b.  There are relatively small increases in U.S. 
exports for all sectors.  Australia’s agricultural and mining and several of the manufactures 
sectors show reductions in exports, and there are increases in Australia’s exports of food, 
beverages & tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, and services.  The increases in U.S. imports are 
concentrated in agriculture, food, beverages & tobacco, textiles, and services, and there are small 
declines across most of the other manufactures sectors.  Australia’s imports are seen to increase in 
all sectors, reflecting the relatively higher trade barriers being removed compared to the United 
States.  U.S. output rises by relatively small percentages in most sectors, while Australian output 
increases and declines appear broadly to reflect the changes in sectoral exports.   
  U.S. employment changes reflect the output changes, with rather small absolute and 
percentage increases in agriculture, mining, and manufactures and declines in food, beverages & 
tobacco, and in services.  For Australia, there are small absolute and percentage employment 
increases in food, beverages & tobacco and in trade & transport and other private services and 
declines in agriculture, mining, and across virtually all manufactures. 
  Changes in bilateral trade flows are indicated in Table 7c.  U.S. exports to Australia 
increase by $2.1 billion and imports from Australia increase by $3.5 billion.  As with the CAFTA, 
there is noteworthy evidence of trade diversion for most of the other trading partners. 
It thus appears that the U.S.-Australia FTA will have fairly small effects on the aggregate 
economic welfare and the sectoral trade, output, and employment of the two countries. As 
mentioned above, there are several non-trade issues that should be taken into account in 
evaluating the FTA, as well as the potential changes in foreign direct investment, capital 
formation, productivity, and technical change.  But the questions again are how significant these 
various changes might be as compared to the rather small effects stemming from the bilateral 
elimination of the trade barriers in the FTAs, and how significant the effects of trade diversion 
might be.   23
5.  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE U.S.-MOROCCO FTA 
a.  The Main Features of the U.S.-Morocco FTA 
The U.S.-Morocco FTA was signed and approved by the U.S. Senate in July 2004.  As with the 
other U.S. FTAs, there was a common framework guiding the negotiations, with the details of 
course reflecting the concerns of the United States and Morocco.  The U.S. objectives in pursuing 
an FTA with Morocco were stated in the January 21, 2003 ‘Notification Letters to Congress,’ 
reproduced on the USTR website (www.ustr.gov) and sent from USTR Robert B. Zoellick 
notifying the intention to initiate negotiations for an FTA with Morocco.  The primary U.S. 
objectives were as follows (p. 1): 
•  ‘…it is in the United States’ interest to pursue a free trade agreement with Morocco.  An 
FTA will create improved commercial and market opportunities for U.S. exports to 
Morocco and to North and West Africa.  It will foster economic growth, increase living 
standards, and create higher paying jobs in the United States and Morocco by reducing 
and eliminating barriers to trade, while reinforcing American values in the region.  The 
FTA will also strengthen our relations with a country that was one of the first to condemn 
the September 11 terrorist attacks and has stood by our side ever since. 
•  Trade liberalization with Morocco will support this Administration’s commitment to 
promote more tolerant, open, and prosperous Muslim societies.  A U.S.-Morocco FTA 
will support the significant economic and political reforms underway in Morocco, 
enhance the Moroccan government’s efforts to attract new trade and investment, … 
promote sustainable development…and help create better jobs for Morocco’s citizens.  
For both Morocco and the United States of course implementation of the agreement will 
be critical to realizing its benefits.  The Administration therefore intends to target 
ongoing development assistance and trade-related technical assistance to help Morocco 
follow through the commitments it will make as part of the FTA.’ 
It is also mentioned in USTR, ‘Trade Facts’ (p. 2, January 21, 2003), which is available 
on the USTR website, that:  
‘Morocco has begun implementing an association agreement with the European Union 
(EU), which provides preferential tariff treatment for most EU industrial and some 
agricultural exports to Morocco, putting American producers at a comparative 
disadvantage.  The FTA will improve U.S. exporters’ competitiveness in this market.’
24 
                                                 
24 According to Belghazi et al. (2002, p. 28), following the implementation of the Morocco-EU Association 
Agreement in March 2001, the overall, trade-weighted tariff advantage favoring the EU was an estimated 
3.3% in 2001.  But for some particular agricultural products and manufactures, the preferences were to be 
become much greater over the 12-year phase-in period.  Thus, there may be a potential for trade diversion 
that would favor EU suppliers relative to the United States.  A U.S.-Morocco FTA would accordingly 
diminish the EU tariff advantages and place the United States on a more equal footing in exporting to   24
  It is evident from the statement of these objectives that the United States had a variety of 
economic, political, and national security interests in undertaking an FTA with Morocco.  We 
turn now to consider in particular the effects of the trade liberalization in the U.S.-Morocco FTA. 
b.  Computational Results of the U.S.-Morocco FTA 
As noted in Table 2 above, U.S. trade in goods and services with Morocco is rather small, less 
than $1 billion for U.S. exports to and imports from Morocco in the 1997 base data.  More detail 
on Morocco’s trade broken down by sector and destination/origin is provided in Table 3.  It can 
be seen that the U.S. shares in Morocco’s exports are 10.5% in mining products, 13.3% in 
machinery & equipment, 20-30% in services, and relatively small in the remaining sectors.  By 
far the largest proportions of Morocco’s exports of agricultural products and manufactures are 
with the EU and EFTA.  On the import side, the United States accounted for 18% of Morocco’s 
agricultural imports, 15% of food, beverages & tobacco, 11% of non-metallic mineral products, 
21% of trade & transport services, 19% of other private services, and 68% of government 
services.  But for imports as well, the EU and EFTA account for very substantial proportions of 
Morocco’s imports of manufactures. 
  The global welfare effects of the U.S.-Morocco FTA are indicated in Table 8a.  The 
effects of removal of bilateral agricultural protection are negligible.  The bilateral elimination of 
manufactures tariffs increases U.S. welfare by $0.4 billion and Morocco’s welfare by $0.2 billion 
(0.5% of GNP).  The removal of services barriers increases U.S. welfare by $5.6 billion (0.05% 
of GNP) and Morocco’s welfare by $0.6 billion (1.4% of GNP).  The total welfare increase for 
the United States is $6.0 billion (0.05% of GNP) and $0.9 billion for Morocco (2.0% of GNP).
25  
Global welfare is increased by $7.5 billion. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Morocco.  But in view of the limited U.S. shares of Morocco’s imports compared to the EU and EFTA, it 
may require special efforts in the future by U.S. firms to increase their exports to Morocco in competition 
with European firms. 
25 Andriamananjara and Tsigas (2003, p. 16) estimate that the U.S.-Morocco FTA will reduce Morocco’s 
economic welfare by $108 million (-0.3% of GDP) and will increase U.S. welfare by $161 million (.002%   25
The sectoral results are presented in Table 8b.  There are negligible percentage changes 
in U.S. exports and imports.  Morocco’s exports of agricultural products and leather products & 
footwear are reduced somewhat, and there are increases of 1.5-3% in the exports of manufactures, 
and increases of 4.7-21% in services.  Morocco’s imports are increased to some extent in all 
sectors except metal products, with the largest increases particularly in services.  There are 
negligible changes in U.S. sectoral outputs.  Moroccan output declines in agricultural products, 
food, beverages & tobacco, and leather products & footwear, and rises in other sectors, ranging 
between 0.5% for transportation equipment to 1.9% for machinery & equipments.  U.S. 
employment rises by 1,314 workers in agriculture and 389 workers in government services, and 
there are small declines in a number of the other sectors.  The percentage changes in U.S. sectoral 
employment are thus negligible.  For Morocco, the largest employment increases are in trade & 
transport, textiles, and wearing apparel, and the largest declines in agriculture, food, beverages & 
tobacco, and government services. 
The changes in bilateral trade are shown in Table 8c.  U.S. exports to Morocco increase 
by $658 million and imports from Morocco by $437 million.  The imports of the EU/EFTA from 
Morocco increase by $124 million and EU/EFTA exports to Morocco decline by $78 million. 
As noted above, the United States had a number of interrelated objectives in negotiating 
an FTA with Morocco.  The effects of the bilateral elimination of barriers on agricultural 
products, manufactures, and services are seen to be fairly small, given especially the 
comparatively small size of existing trade between the United States and Morocco.  It is 
conceivable that U.S. trade with Morocco will increase in the future as the bilateral relationship is 
further developed.  It may also be the case that the FTA will serve to reinforce the process of 
economic reform and economic development in Morocco over time and enhance U.S. economic 
and national security influence in the wider region of North and West Africa and the Middle East. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of GDP).  Terms-of-trade effects are again evidently dominant.  See also USITC (2004c) for some GTAP 
economywide and selected sectoral effects.  The overall welfare effects in these studies are much lower 
than the results based on the Michigan Model.     26
6. WELFARE COMPARISONS OF BILATERAL FTAS, UNILATERAL FREE TRADE,   
AND GLOBAL FREE TRADE 
Having now analyzed the economic effects of the bilateral FTAs between the United States and 
CAFTA members, Australia, and Morocco, we now consider whether the economic interests of 
these countries would be more or less enhanced by unilateral free trade and global (multilateral) 
free trade as compared to the adoption of bilateral FTAs.  The welfare comparisons are indicated 
in Table 9 and can be summarized as follows: 
1.  U.S. unilateral free trade increases U.S. economic welfare by $320 billion (3.2% of 
GNP).  In comparison, the three FTAs combined increase U.S. welfare by $27 
billion. Global welfare rises by $507 billion with U.S. unilateral free trade compared 
to $47 billion for the three FTAs combined.  The U.S. adoption of unilateral free 
trade would thus have a very much larger effect on U.S. and global economic welfare 
than the bilateral FTAs, and there would be significant welfare increases for the FTA 
partners even without the FTAs.   
2.  Unilateral free trade increases CAC economic welfare by $6.2 billion, which is 
greater than the $5.3 billion resulting from CAFTA.  Global welfare with unilateral 
free trade rises by $34 billion compared to $16 billion for the CAFTA. 
3.  Unilateral free trade increases Australia’s economic welfare by $4.6 billion compared 
to $5.4 billion for the U.S.-Australia FTA.  Global welfare rises by $19 billion for 
unilateral free trade and $23 billion for the FTA. 
4.  Unilateral free trade increases Morocco’s economic welfare by $1.6 billion compared 
to $0.9 billion for the U.S.-Morocco FTA.  Global welfare rises by $11 billion with 
Moroccan unilateral free trade compared to $8 billion with the FTA. 
These results thus suggest that U.S. and global economic welfare would rise significantly 
more with U.S. unilateral free trade as compared to the bilateral U.S. FTAs.  The CAFTA 
members have a significantly larger welfare gain from unilateral free trade as compared to the 
CAFTA.  Australia’s welfare gains are somewhat greater for the FTA as compared to unilateral 
free trade.  Morocco’s welfare gains from unilateral free trade are about double what they are 
from the bilateral FTA. Global welfare increases noticeably more with unilateral free trade for 
CAFTA and Morocco and is about the same for Australia as compared to the FTAs. 
The welfare effects of global (multilateral) free trade that are shown in Table 9 can be 
summarized as follows:   27
1.  Global free trade increases U.S. economic welfare by $543 billion (5.4% of GNP). 
This is greater than the $320 billion increase in U.S. economic welfare resulting from 
U.S. unilateral free trade.  With global free trade, economic welfare rises by $2.4 
trillion. The components of the increases in welfare from global free trade are $54 
billion for agriculture, $702 billion for manufactures, and $1.7 trillion for services.  
These welfare increases greatly exceed the increases associated with the U.S. 
bilateral FTAs. 
2.  With global free trade, CAC economic welfare increases by $18 billion (15% of 
GNP), as compared to a welfare increase of $6.2 billion for unilateral free trade and 
$5.3 billion for CAFTA. 
3.  With global free trade, Australia’s economic welfare increases by $30 billion (6% of 
GNP).  This compares to a welfare increase of  $4.6 billion with unilateral free trade 
for Australia and $5.4 billion for the U.S.-Australia FTA. 
4.  With global free trade, Morocco’s economic welfare increases by $5 billion (11% of 
GNP) as compared to $1.6 billion for unilateral free trade and $0.9 billion for the 
U.S.-Morocco FTA. 
These calculations clearly show that multilateral trade liberalization offers potentially far 
greater increases in economic welfare for the United States, its FTA partner countries, and the 
other countries/regions that are covered in the global trading system.
26  This is the case even if 
there would be less than complete free trade globally.  That is, if existing trade barriers in the 
ongoing Doha Development Agenda negotiations were to be reduced, for example, by one-third 
or one-half, the resulting global and national gains would be proportionally lower.  But these 
welfare gains would still far exceed the welfare gains from the FTAs that have been analyzed and 
the gains from the possible adoption of unilateral free trade by the United States and other 
countries involved.  This would almost certainly remain true even if there are other benefits 
stemming from the FTAs that have not been taken into account in the Michigan Model 
simulations. 
                                                 
26 Andriamananjara and Tsigas (2003) also calculate the welfare effects of global trade liberalization using 
the standard GTAP model.  Their results (pp. 15-16) indicate that Australia’s welfare would rise by $2.4 
billion (0.6% of GDP), CAC welfare would rise by $2.1 billion (2.3% of GDP), and Morocco’s welfare 
would rise by $778 million (2.3% of GDP).  They do not report the terms-of-trade components for these 
effects, but presumably they are substantial.  In any case, the welfare effects of global trade liberalization 
using the Michigan Model are much higher than the welfare effects based on the standard GTAP model 
used by Andriamananjara and Tsigas.   28
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has been designed to assess the economic effects of the U.S. bilateral FTAs negotiated 
with Central America and the Dominican Republic, Australia, and Morocco. The analysis has 
been based on a version of the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade that covers 18 
economic sectors, including agriculture, manufactures, and services, in each of 22 
countries/regions.  The data for the model are based on Version 5.4 of the GTAP database for 
1997 together with some data derived from other sources. 
The United States uses a common framework covering the issues to be negotiated in each 
of its bilateral FTA negotiations.  This framework follows along the lines of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiated in 1992-93, and it has been updated and adapted for 
the new FTAs.  The main negotiating issues in the FTAs cover bilateral removal of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade in agricultural products, manufactures, and services, rules of origin, 
intellectual property rights, worker rights, environmental standards, investment, government 
procurement, customs administration and trade facilitation, trade remedies, and dispute settlement 
procedures.  The actual negotiations of course reflect the particular conditions and interests of the 
United States and partner countries. 
For modeling purposes, the focus has been on the effects of the bilateral removal of trade 
barriers, which lend themselves most readily to quantification.  The non-trade aspects of the 
FTAs may also be important but are intrinsically more difficult to incorporate into a modeling 
framework.  This is the case as well for the possible increases in foreign direct investment and the 
rate of economic growth and improvements in productivity that may be induced over time as the 
consequence of the FTAs.   The computational results presented for the bilateral FTAs are 
therefore best interpreted as providing a lower bound for the potential benefits involved.  But 
since these benefits have been shown mostly to be rather small for the United States and partner 
countries in both absolute and relative terms, the non-trade and dynamic benefits of the FTAs are   29
unlikely to alter these results significantly.  Furthermore, we may possibly have underestimated 
the negative effects of trade diversion resulting from the FTAs, since, because of the lack of 
information, we did not take rules of origin and other restrictive measures commonly used in 
FTAs into account. 
  To provide some perspective on the results of the FTAs, the model was also used to 
calculate the effects of unilateral tariff removal by the United States, CAC, Australia, and 
Morocco.  Except for Australia, unilateral free trade would result in much larger increases in 
economic welfare for the United States, CAC, and Morocco than the bilateral FTAs.  Finally, the 
effects of global (multilateral) free trade were calculated and shown to be far greater for all of the 
countries as compared to the bilateral FTAs.
27  Our results suggest accordingly that the interests 
of the WTO member countries could be better served if they were able to overcome their 
divisiveness and indecisions and to keep the multilateral negotiations on track.
28  
                                                 
27 As mentioned above, the appendix contains a discussion of sensitivity analysis of introducing alternative 
parameter values in the model and the resulting welfare impacts of trade liberalization. 
28  This conclusion is reinforced in Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2005) in which the negative effects of 
overlapping FTAs negotiated or in process by the United States and Japan are contrasted with the benefits 
that unilateral or multilateral free trade may provide.   30
Appendix 
Sensitivity Analysis 
This appendix reports on sensitivity analysis of the Michigan Model.  There are three key 
elasticities/parameters in the Model:  the elasticity of substitution among varieties, which is 
exogenously set at three; the parameter that measures the sensitivity of consumers to the number 
of varieties, which is set at 0.5; and the elasticities of supply that are taken from the literature. 
  The variety parameter can take on values between zero and one.  The larger it is, 
consumers value variety more.  If the parameter is set at zero, consumers have no preference for 
variety.  This would correspond to the Armington assumption, according to which consumers 
view products depending on their place of production. 
  To analyze the sensitivity of our model results, we have experimented with different 
values of the elasticity of substitution among varieties and the consumer sensitivity to the number 
of varieties.  The following tests were conducted:  (1) increase the elasticity of substitution among 
varieties by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant; (2) decrease the elasticity of 
substitution by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant; (3) increase the consumption 
varieties by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant; and (4) decrease the consumption 
varieties by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant. 
  The results, which are available on request, are not very sensitive to the alternative 
parameters of the consumption varieties.  That is, a 10 percent increase (decrease) in these 
parameters yields only 2 percent larger (smaller) welfare effects compared to the baseline model.  
The sensitivity to the changes in the elasticity of substitution is large compared with the results of 
differences in the variety parameters.  For some countries, the differences are greater than 10 
percent. 
  In Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2000), sensitivity tests reveal that the model may 
exaggerate the likely gains from economies of scale due to trade liberalization in the context of 
expansion of the NAFTA.  But the error is small in this context because the impact of trade   31
liberalization is small.  When econometric estimates of scale economies are incorporated into the 
model, the welfare gains due to capital flows are shown to remain robust.   32
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 Table 1.  Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Rates by Sector for the United States, Central America and the Caribbean (CAC), Australia, and Morocco
(Percent)
United States CAC Australia Morocco
Global CAC Australia Morocco Global U.S. Global U.S. Global U.S.
Agriculture 2.7 1.0 4.0 0.1 3.1 0.4 1.6 1.8 7.1 6.9
Mining 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.7 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.4
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 3.5 3.0 3.4 2.8 8.2 8.5 3.2 3.4 14.3 9.6
Textiles 5.7 6.8 6.5 7.1 13.0 14.5 12.5 12.3 27.5 18.6
Wearing Apparel 11.0 11.6 9.7 10.5 23.5 25.7 6.3 3.8 34.1 27.9
Leather Products & Footwear 7.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 13.7 16.4 11.9 12.6 23.5 0.0
Wood & Wood Products 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.7 9.9 9.8 3.0 3.2 16.8 21.9
Chemicals 1.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 7.6 8.0 3.1 3.4 13.0 14.8
Non-metallic Min. Products 3.2 3.8 2.9 0.9 11.4 11.0 4.7 5.1 18.0 17.1
Metal Products 1.4 0.5 0.2 1.4 7.6 8.1 4.0 4.8 9.6 20.7
Transportation Equipment 1.2 1.3 1.5 0.3 8.1 10.4 7.3 4.2 13.9 7.2
Machinery & Equipment 1.0 0.3 1.6 0.0 5.8 5.6 3.2 3.0 10.5 11.4
Other Manufactures 1.3 2.2 0.9 0.0 13.6 17.0 3.6 3.7 25.3 25.1
Elec., Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 18.0 18.0 4.0 4.0 29.0 29.0
Trade & Transport 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 32.0 32.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 27.0
Other Private Services 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 34.0 34.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 33.0
Government Services 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 17.0 17.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
Note: Central America and Caribbean (CAC) members include Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
Sources: Adapted from Francois and Strutt (1999); Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002); and Diamaranan and McDougall (2002).Table 2.  Value of U.S. Sectoral Trade by Destination and Origin, 1997 (Millions of U.S. Dollars)
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports
World CAC Australia Morocco World CAC Australia Morocco
Agriculture 35,176 1,098 109 128 18,602 2,280 181 15
Mining 6,421 26 22 6 69,939 664 413 72
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 30,541 1,464 281 75 28,813 1,421 898 41
Textiles 11,485 1,362 159 11 21,514 1,725 169 4
Wearing Apparel 6,847 2,428 35 4 38,335 5,443 45 62
Leather products & Footwear 2,280 213 24 0 21,842 438 28 5
Wood & Wood Products 29,386 1,094 542 8 43,785 165 85 4
Chemicals 90,569 2,737 2,129 26 77,142 879 302 11
Non-metallic Min. Products 11,921 269 318 20 14,071 369 40 2
Metal Products 34,238 712 312 1 56,001 429 998 5
Transportation Equipment 102,640 953 1,800 89 128,874 21 613 0
Machinery & Equipment 269,892 3,795 5,440 77 307,001 1,128 549 94
Other Manufactures 11,322 273 210 2 39,851 289 80 3
Elec., Gas & Water 751 2 4 0 2,230 5 2 1
Construction 4,023 32 3 0 1,268 18 3 2
Trade & Transport 81,445 514 1,675 60 75,050 873 2,084 163
Other Private Services 81,707 588 1,047 66 59,724 522 1,034 77
Government Services 42,165 282 574 321 18,838 335 501 222
Total 852,808 17,843 14,686 894 1,022,879 17,004 8,025 782
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports
World CAC Australia Morocco World CAC Australia Morocco
Agriculture 100.0 3.1 0.3 0.4 100.0 12.3 1.0 0.1
Mining 100.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 100.0 0.9 0.6 0.1
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 100.0 4.8 0.9 0.2 100.0 4.9 3.1 0.1
Textiles 100.0 11.9 1.4 0.1 100.0 8.0 0.8 0.0
Wearing Apparel 100.0 35.5 0.5 0.1 100.0 14.2 0.1 0.2
Leather Products & Footwear 100.0 9.3 1.0 0.0 100.0 2.0 0.1 0.0
Wood & Wood Products 100.0 3.7 1.8 0.0 100.0 0.4 0.2 0.0
Chemicals 100.0 3.0 2.4 0.0 100.0 1.1 0.4 0.0
Non-metallic Min. Products 100.0 2.3 2.7 0.2 100.0 2.6 0.3 0.0
Metal Products 100.0 2.1 0.9 0.0 100.0 0.8 1.8 0.0
Transportation Equipment 100.0 0.9 1.8 0.1 100.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Machinery & Equipment 100.0 1.4 2.0 0.0 100.0 0.4 0.2 0.0
Other Manufactures 100.0 2.4 1.9 0.0 100.0 0.7 0.2 0.0
Elec., Gas & Water 100.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 100.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
Construction 100.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 100.0 1.4 0.2 0.1
Trade & Transport 100.0 0.6 2.1 0.1 100.0 1.2 2.8 0.2
Other Private Services 100.0 0.7 1.3 0.1 100.0 0.9 1.7 0.1
Government Services 100.0 0.7 1.4 0.8 100.0 1.8 2.7 1.2
Total 100.0 2.1 1.7 0.1 100.0 1.7 0.8 0.1
Source: GTAP 5.4 adapted from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002).Table 3.  Sectoral Tariff Rates and Shares of Australia, Central America and the Caribbean (CAC), and Morocco Trade by Destination and Origin, 1997
(Percent)
Tariff Australia Central America and the Caribbean Morocco
Australia
Japan U.S. EU and 
EFTA




Global U.S. EU and 
EFTA
Global
Agriculture 2.5 1.8 1.9 0.1 1.6 0.4 5.1 11.9 9.4 3.1 6.9 5.8 7.1
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.8 5.3 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.4 2.9 0.5
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1.7 3.4 5.5 6.0 3.2 8.5 10.6 10.6 15.7 8.2 9.6 22.2 14.3
Textiles 14.5 12.3 12.2 15.0 12.5 14.5 13.8 5.9 10.2 13.0 18.6 28.3 27.5
Wearing Apparel 5.8 3.8 11.6 7.4 6.3 25.7 17.4 8.3 19.5 23.5 27.9 34.5 34.1
Leather Products & Footwear 4.5 12.6 15.6 12.4 11.9 16.4 14.0 8.6 16.2 13.7 0.0 23.7 23.5
Wood & Wood Products 3.7 3.2 3.4 4.4 3.0 9.8 8.6 6.4 10.1 9.9 21.9 18.4 16.8
Chemicals 5.8 3.4 2.4 4.7 3.1 8.0 6.6 3.7 7.1 7.6 14.8 13.9 13.0
Non-metallic Min. Products 5.0 5.1 4.5 4.8 4.7 11.0 12.1 8.8 11.2 11.4 17.1 21.6 18.0
Metal Products 5.6 4.8 5.3 5.3 4.0 8.1 8.2 6.1 6.7 7.6 20.7 10.6 9.6
Transportation Equipment 8.5 4.2 7.9 4.8 7.3 10.4 10.4 8.8 6.9 8.1 7.2 14.8 13.9
Machinery & Equipment 3.7 3.0 3.8 4.1 3.2 5.6 4.5 5.7 4.9 5.8 11.4 11.0 10.5
Other Manufactures 4.1 3.7 3.4 4.3 3.6 17.0 11.5 14.8 13.8 13.6 25.1 27.1 25.3
Elec., Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 29.0 29.0 29.0
Trade & Transport 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 27.0 27.0 27.0
Other Private Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 33.0 33.0 33.0
Government Services 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
Exports
Japan U.S. EU and 
EFTA




Global U.S. EU and 
EFTA
Global
Agriculture 13.1 2.2 16.9 10.7 100.0 38.1 47.6 0.6 0.3 100.0 2.4 79.7 100.0
Mining 42.4 2.9 13.8 7.0 100.0 84.7 7.4 0.1 1.8 100.0 10.5 51.5 100.0
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 27.0 11.3 9.5 2.6 100.0 30.2 22.6 1.6 3.0 100.0 4.5 52.3 100.0
Textiles 11.4 9.8 17.0 16.9 100.0 82.0 5.5 0.6 2.3 100.0 1.0 86.8 100.0
Wearing Apparel 7.6 16.3 20.4 6.3 100.0 94.2 1.4 0.1 0.7 100.0 3.0 94.0 100.0
Leather Products & Footwear 2.2 6.7 52.0 5.9 100.0 69.4 7.6 0.6 6.2 100.0 1.9 80.3 100.0
Wood & Wood Products 36.6 6.1 6.8 5.7 100.0 24.7 11.5 1.8 6.0 100.0 3.8 69.6 100.0
Chemicals 6.4 8.7 9.7 3.6 100.0 19.4 15.3 3.1 8.7 100.0 1.0 40.0 100.0
Non-metallic Min. Products 15.1 7.8 11.2 2.6 100.0 57.5 5.2 1.0 8.2 100.0 3.9 66.4 100.0
Metal Products 13.3 9.3 6.0 5.9 100.0 19.4 27.9 2.8 5.1 100.0 3.1 73.9 100.0
Transportation Equipment 4.9 21.4 12.8 0.9 100.0 1.4 43.9 0.1 2.1 100.0 1.4 79.4 100.0
Machinery & Equipment 5.7 11.4 15.0 4.2 100.0 57.6 7.7 1.1 10.8 100.0 13.3 80.0 100.0
Other Manufactures 10.5 9.6 54.3 0.4 100.0 45.6 39.3 0.5 3.4 100.0 5.4 84.9 100.0
Elec., Gas & Water 17.0 10.7 40.6 1.3 100.0 10.8 46.2 1.1 16.6 100.0 17.6 41.2 100.0
Construction 14.1 3.9 42.7 2.3 100.0 22.7 33.2 1.1 4.1 100.0 13.8 37.7 100.0
Trade & Transport 12.2 24.1 39.6 2.2 100.0 15.5 43.8 0.9 3.3 100.0 20.1 40.1 100.0
Other Private Services 10.4 17.3 44.2 1.6 100.0 20.5 39.5 1.2 3.2 100.0 20.2 39.9 100.0
Government Services 12.7 24.6 35.9 2.0 100.0 38.6 25.3 1.0 2.8 100.0 31.3 31.3 100.0
Total 18.7 11.0 19.5 5.1 100.0 40.9 25.2 1.1 3.6 100.0 8.7 64.2 100.0
Imports
Japan U.S. EU and 
EFTA




Global U.S. EU and 
EFTA
Global
Agriculture 1.4 17.3 9.2 4.3 100.0 59.6 7.7 3.5 9.2 100.0 18.1 31.2 100.0
Mining 0.0 0.8 0.8 1.3 100.0 0.9 0.6 16.1 59.6 100.0 0.7 5.2 100.0
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1.8 13.1 31.6 2.7 100.0 36.6 23.2 3.5 9.5 100.0 15.0 34.4 100.0
Textiles 3.1 7.5 15.7 25.8 100.0 47.1 5.1 4.8 1.7 100.0 0.9 91.6 100.0
Wearing Apparel 0.7 2.9 9.3 52.8 100.0 77.7 1.6 0.6 1.1 100.0 1.1 93.4 100.0
Leather Products & Footwear 0.3 2.8 18.2 47.9 100.0 29.9 6.5 3.0 4.4 100.0 0.2 91.9 100.0
Wood & Wood Products 2.9 17.6 34.2 3.6 100.0 53.4 11.6 4.6 7.4 100.0 2.0 76.4 100.0
Chemicals 7.9 25.2 35.9 4.4 100.0 34.2 16.1 7.8 12.1 100.0 2.3 74.0 100.0
Non-metallic Min. Products 7.6 26.2 38.7 7.0 100.0 28.5 22.7 13.1 12.2 100.0 10.7 54.3 100.0
Metal Products 11.6 9.0 25.3 6.0 100.0 28.9 19.6 10.3 10.0 100.0 0.2 76.4 100.0
Transportation Equipment 35.9 24.6 24.4 1.0 100.0 8.0 13.5 1.4 2.5 100.0 14.3 70.5 100.0
Machinery & Equipment 16.6 25.4 28.5 5.0 100.0 47.2 19.7 4.7 2.6 100.0 4.4 78.8 100.0
Other Manufactures 9.0 13.8 23.6 25.8 100.0 24.9 51.3 1.9 1.2 100.0 1.6 71.9 100.0
Elec., Gas & Water 7.4 25.8 46.6 0.6 100.0 8.7 50.9 0.0 19.9 100.0 4.8 67.5 100.0
Construction 2.2 5.0 45.5 0.3 100.0 14.4 49.4 0.4 1.4 100.0 9.1 38.6 100.0
Trade & Transport 8.3 22.3 36.6 2.3 100.0 21.0 32.8 1.5 2.8 100.0 21.3 33.8 100.0
Other Private Services 6.5 18.4 51.7 0.5 100.0 21.2 44.5 0.7 2.5 100.0 18.8 45.8 100.0
Government Services 4.5 50.9 26.1 1.2 100.0 50.5 24.2 0.5 2.0 100.0 67.5 18.3 100.0
Total 12.3 20.7 29.7 6.0 100.0 31.9 17.0 4.7 8.4 100.0 9.1 60.6 100.0
Sources: Adapted from Francois and Strutt (1999); Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002); and Dimaranan and McDougall (2002).Table 4.  Employment by Sector, 1997: United States, Central America and Caribbean (CAC), Australia, and Morocco
(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers)
United States CAC Australia Morocco
% Workers % Workers % Workers % Workers
Agriculture 2.7 3,538,000 25.8 4,073,711 5.1 430,500 5.2 551,756
Mining 0.5 634,000 0.6 97,348 0.9 74,700 0.9 92,638
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1.7 2,144,942 4.6 725,235 2.5 208,261 5.3 568,097
Textiles 0.7 948,740 1.1 179,245 0.5 41,401 3.6 383,401
Wearing Apparel 0.6 796,958 3.3 512,837 0.5 45,165 6.1 653,094
Leather Products & Footwear 0.1 111,039 0.4 63,601 0.1 12,546 0.8 84,187
Wood & Wood Products 1.7 2,218,458 1.3 207,217 2.6 214,534 1.5 158,119
Chemicals 2.1 2,666,937 1.7 260,793 1.3 112,913 2.5 264,465
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.5 689,823 0.6 88,125 0.6 47,674 2.1 220,204
Metal Products 2.4 3,053,744 0.7 117,625 2.3 189,442 1.3 140,167
Transportation Equipment 1.7 2,244,402 0.2 28,232 1.2 96,603 0.6 66,464
Machinery & Equipment 4.2 5,440,783 0.8 123,325 1.8 150,550 1.1 113,417
Other Manufactures 0.4 519,174 0.2 33,932 0.2 16,310 0.0 3,072
Elec., Gas & Water 1.2 1,493,000 0.9 137,560 0.8 65,500 0.9 96,964
Construction 6.4 8,302,000 6.2 982,142 6.9 580,300 9.0 959,465
Trade & Transport 26.6 34,466,000 24.1 3,800,310 31.9 2,674,100 25.8 2,756,743
Other Private Services 11.4 14,768,000 2.6 404,888 14.3 1,197,200 2.3 243,811
Government Services 35.1 45,521,000 24.9 3,924,632 26.6 2,229,000 31.1 3,318,934
Total 100.0 129,557,000 100.0 15,760,757 100.0 8,386,700 100.0 10,675,000
Sources: ILO website (2003); Taiwan government website (2002); UNIDO (2003); and World Bank (2003).Table 5.  Stock of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Abroad, 2002
(Percent of Total FDI Stock and Millions of U.S. Dollars)
World CAC Australia Morocco
% Mil. % Mil. % Mil. % Mil.
Mining 5.3 80,976 n.a. n.a. 22.6 8,218 n.a. n.a.
Utilities 1.4 20,932 n.a. n.a. 4.5 1,629 n.a. n.a.
Manufacturing Total 25.8 392,553 n.a. n.a. 29.7 10,781 n.a. n.a.
Of which: Food 1.9 28,240 7.6 136 3.6 1,304 n.a. n.a.
Chemicals 6.5 99,371 n.a. n.a. 4.2 1,522 n.a. n.a.
Primary and fabricated metals 1.6 24,359 1.6 28 7.0 2,553 n.a. n.a.
Machinery 1.4 22,025 0.1 1 0.9 322 n.a. n.a.
Computer and electronic products 4.6 69,208 n.a. n.a. 0.4 132 n.a. n.a.
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 0.7 10,166 5.8 104 0.3 123 n.a. n.a.
Transportation equipment 3.2 48,378 n.a. n.a. 3.1 1,112 n.a. n.a.
Wholesale trade 7.6 114,895 1.2 21 7.9 2,869 n.a. n.a.
Information 3.5 53,841 n.a. n.a. 1.2 441 n.a. n.a.
Depository institutions 3.5 52,935 n.a. n.a. 4.7 1,692 n.a. n.a.
Finance (except depository institutions) and insurance 16.1 244,480 1.1 19 10.9 3,951 n.a. n.a.
Professional, scientific, and technical services 2.5 38,307 1.5 26 3.0 1,076 n.a. n.a.
Other industries 34.3 522,047 n.a. n.a. 15.6 5,678 n.a. n.a.
Total 100.0 1,520,965 100.0 1,786 100.0 36,337 n.a. n.a.
Notes: 1) FDI data for CAC refer only to Costa Rica and Honduras.
           2) n.a. means not available.
Source: Adapted from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003).Table 6a.  Global Welfare Effects of U.S.-Central America and the Caribbean (CAC) FTA (Billions of U.S. Dollars and Percent)
Agricultural Protection Manufactures Tariffs Services Barriers Total Real Returns
% Bil. % Bil. % Bil. % Bil. Capital Labor
Japan 0.00 (0.14) -0.03 (1.67) 0.01 0.44 -0.02 -1.37  -0.01 0.00
United States 0.00 0.07 0.04 3.72 0.13 13.47 0.17 17.26 0.07 0.06
Canada 0.00 (0.02) -0.02 (0.20) 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.16  0.00 -0.01 
Australia 0.00 (0.01) -0.03 (0.13) 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.11  0.00 0.00
New Zealand 0.00 (0.00) -0.02 (0.02) 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02  0.00 0.00
EU and EFTA 0.00 (0.31) -0.03 (3.67) 0.00 0.54 -0.03 -3.44  -0.01  -0.01 
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 -0.04 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) -0.04 -0.08  -0.02  -0.03 
China 0.00 0.01 -0.05 (0.49) 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.46  0.00 -0.01 
Korea 0.00 (0.02) -0.04 (0.24) 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.20  -0.01  -0.01 
Singapore 0.00 (0.00) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02  0.00 -0.01 
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 -0.05 (0.21) 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.19  0.00 -0.02 
Indonesia 0.00 (0.00) -0.05 (0.14) 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.13  -0.01  -0.03 
Malaysia 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01  0.01 -0.01 
Philippines 0.00 0.00 -0.09 (0.09) 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.08  0.00 -0.10 
Thailand 0.00 (0.00) -0.04 (0.08) 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.07  0.00 -0.02 
Rest of Asia 0.00 (0.01) -0.03 (0.22) 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.21  0.01 -0.01 
Chile 0.00 (0.00) -0.04 (0.04) 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04  -0.01  -0.01 
Mexico 0.00 0.01 -0.04 (0.21) 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.15  -0.01  -0.01 
Central America and the Caribbean (CAC) -0.01 (0.01) 2.90 3.47 1.53 1.84 4.42 5.30 4.47 4.42
South America 0.00 (0.04) -0.01 (0.15) 0.01 0.13 0.00 -0.05  0.00 0.00
Morocco 0.00 (0.00) -0.03 (0.01) 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 0.00 (0.00) -0.02 (0.03) 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02  0.00 0.00
Total (0.48) (0.51) 16.71 15.72Table 6b.  U.S.-Central America and the Caribbean (CAC) FTA: Change in Exports, Imports, Outputs, and Number of Workers
(Percent, Millions of Dollars, and the Number of Workers)
Exports Imports Output Employment
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
U.S. CAC U.S. CAC U.S. CAC U.S. CAC
Agriculture 0.92 1.47 2.09 23.43 0.06 -0.58  0.06 -0.58 
Mining 0.06 -12.97  0.04 1.42 0.16 -12.81  0.09 -13.62 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 2.10 13.58 2.44 20.41 0.09 1.05 0.02 -1.87 
Textiles 6.28 53.69 4.06 26.26 -0.32  34.58 -0.55  27.85
Wearing Apparel 11.47 69.66 7.78 18.36 -1.28  51.57 -1.77  42.20
Leather Products & Footwear 5.68 38.63 0.22 14.01 1.75 20.08 1.51 14.55
Wood & Wood Products 1.11 -2.97  0.01 18.48 0.12 -5.32  0.08 -8.98 
Chemicals 0.79 -4.15  0.02 12.82 0.15 -4.23  0.10 -7.31 
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.68 -0.94  0.10 12.44 0.12 -5.28  0.10 -7.75 
Metal Products 0.55 -7.69  0.05 9.57 0.12 -7.22  0.07 -10.20 
Transportation Equipment 0.28 -3.99  0.02 1.74 0.11 -4.26  0.05 -8.51 
Machinery & Equipment 0.26 0.88 0.10 7.49 0.10 -6.10  0.07 -9.95 
Other Manufactures 1.20 0.26 0.00 11.87 0.36 -4.04  0.30 -6.92 
Elec., Gas & Water 0.01 -5.48  0.06 7.02 0.06 1.00 0.01 -0.38 
Construction 0.49 -2.32  0.28 14.08 0.03 -1.37  0.00 -1.42 
Trade & Transport 0.48 3.70 0.75 21.46 0.04 0.23 0.00 -1.90 
Other Private Services 0.57 3.73 0.61 24.98 0.03 -2.41  0.01 -2.82 
Government Services 0.35 15.89 1.02 28.91 0.00 -0.84  0.00 -1.89 
Exports Imports Output Employment
(Value) (Value) (Value) (Number of Workers)
a
U.S. CAC U.S. CAC U.S. CAC U.S. CAC
Agriculture 444 95 472 541 162 (113) 2,173 (23,731)
Mining 5 (110) 35 57 189 (293) 596 (12,650)
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1,002 887 1,009 1,034 512 203 495 (14,061)
Textiles 954 1,648 1,157 999 (354) 2,457 (5,133) 53,741
Wearing Apparel 1,029 5,351 3,742 716 (1,149) 4,060 (14,006) 230,663
Leather Products & Footwear 171 297 62 122 212 310 1,512 9,518
Wood & Wood Products 422 (13) 8 422 589 (246) 1,761 (18,415)
Chemicals 928 (137) 20 1,047 1,123 (527) 2,667 (19,202)
Non-metallic Min. Products 106 (5) 16 126 118 (111) 666 (6,720)
Metal Products 243 (174) 32 266 519 (423) 2,218 (11,865)
Transportation Equipment 370 (81) 37 282 577 (184) 1,069 (2,310)
Machinery & Equipment 913 19 377 764 915 (310) 3,626 (12,126)
Other Manufactures 177 2 1 161 171 (66) 1,558 (2,361)
Elec., Gas & Water 0 (3) 2 2 198 52 156 (518)
Construction 25 (2) 4 49 310 (117) 31 (13,873)
Trade & Transport 500 265 715 705 862 65 640 (71,515)
Other Private Services 603 117 459 959 1,088 (608) 1,362 (11,273)
Government Services 191 174 243 274 79 (122) (1,390) (73,302)
Total 8,081 8,331 8,391 8,526 6,122 4,025 0 0
a) Changes in employment sum to zero because of assumption of full employment.Table 6c.  U.S.-Central America and the Caribbean (CAC) FTA: Changes in Bilateral Trade Flows (Millions of Dollars)
To
From JPN USA CAN AUS NZL EUN HKG CHN KOR SGP TWN IDN MYS PHL THA ROA CHL MEX CAC SAM MCC SAC ROW Exports
Japan JPN 0 20 (1) (1) 03 6 (16) (92) (11) (5) (23) (13) (5) (4) (7) (14) 0 (2) 6700 (13) (137)
United States USA 1 0 57 1 1 59 (11) (40) (6) 1 (18) (10) (4) (10) (4) (16) 3 13 8,056 42 0 1 (33) 8,081
Canada CAN (3) (23) 0 (0) 06 (2) (6) (1) (0) (2) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 0 (1) 2 9300 (3) (12)
Australia AUS (4) (0) 1016 (3) (7) (3) (0) (4) (4) (1) (2) (1) (4) 0 (0) 9100 (2) (18)
New Zealand NZL (1) (2) 0 (1) 01 (1) (1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (0) (1) (0) (1) 0 (0) 6000 (1) (2)
EU and EFTA EUN (63) (177) (18) (14) (2) 0 (37) (99) (30) (17) (31) (29) (16) (22) (17) (68) (1) (17) 284 11 (0) (8) (111) (481)
Hong Kong HKG 5 (140) (1) 203011510201000 1 3201 (5) (106)
China CHN 7 (311) 410 8 0 (32) 0 1 2 1 5826 (1) 4 (3) 02 (122) 902 (8) (327)
Korea KOR 1 (60) 110 1 8 (10) (37) 01 (2) (7) 1 (3) (1) (10) 0 (1) 1 8400 (7) (95)
Singapore SGP 08100 1 5 (4) (15) (1) 0 (2) (7) (3) (2) (1) (10) 007100 (4) (15)
Taiwan TWN 18 (43) 421 4 42 (70) 180 (3) 3 (8) 1 (12) 014401 (1) (44)
Indonesia IDN 20 (87) (0) 20 (5) (2) (1) 5220201 (1) 00 (11) 100 (1) (74)
Malaysia MYS 2 (10) 110 1 4 (3) (7) (0) 3 (2) (1) 0 (0) 0 (5) 000200 (2) (7)
Philippines PHL 2 (97) 200 2 11 (0) 2321201 (1) (1) 0 (2) 200 (1) (63)
Thailand THA 9 (48) 110 1 6 (1) (4) 160 (1) 2 (0) 0 (3) 00 (1) 100 (2) (23)
Rest of Asia ROA 12 (218) 120 2 30124112020015301 (5) (160)
Chile CHL (3) (2) 0 (0) 0 (1) (1) (1) (1) (0) (2) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1) 0 (1) 500 (0) (0) (9)
Mexico MEX 2 (93) 500 1 3 (0) (1) 010 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 20 5 1902 (1) (11)
Central America and the Caribbean CAC (175) 9,835 (73) (15) (4) (917) (5) (26) (59) (29) (6) (12) (8) (7) (9) (18) (13) (35) 0 (83) (7) (6) (1) 8,331
South America SAM (7) (46) (2) (1) (0) (10) (3) (11) (3) (1) (4) (2) (1) (1) (1) (4) (1) (4) 1 0 700 (1) (5) 1
Morocco MCC (0) (2) 000 (0) 0 (0) (0) 0000 (0) 0 (1) 0 (0) 1000 (0) (4)
Southern African Customs Union SAC (0) (6) 0006 (1) (1) (1) 0 (1) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1) 0 (0) 5100 (2) (3)
Rest of the world ROW (33) (105) (3) (2) (0) 6 (7) (29) (19) (13) (4) (8) (2) (8) (7) (36) 0 (2) 5 820 (1) 0 (210)
Imports (210) 8,391 (21) (23) (2) (566) (136) (445) (110) (19) (84) (97) (22) (71) (38) (210) (9) (46) 8,526 21 (5) (7) (206)Table 7a.  Global Welfare Effects of U.S.-Australia FTA (Billions of U.S. Dollars and Percent)
Agricultural Protection Manufactures Tariffs Services Barriers Total Real Returns
% Bil. % Bil. % Bil. % Bil. Capital Labor
Japan 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.53) -0.01 -0.64  -0.01  -0.01 
United States 0.00 0.01 0.03 2.60 0.17 16.77 0.20 19.39 0.02 0.02
Canada 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 0.06 -0.01 (0.12) 0.00 -0.06  0.01 0.00
Australia 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.51 0.98 4.89 1.08 5.40 0.66 0.76
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 -0.03 (0.02) 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
EU and EFTA 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.24) 0.00 (0.16) 0.00 -0.39  0.00 0.00
Hong Kong 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.01 -0.02 (0.04) -0.02 -0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.11) -0.01 -0.14  -0.01  -0.01 
Korea 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.02) -0.02 (0.10) -0.02 -0.12  -0.02  -0.02 
Singapore 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
Taiwan 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.10) -0.02 -0.11  -0.02  -0.02 
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
Malaysia 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 -0.03  -0.01  -0.02 
Philippines 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 0.01 -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 -0.03  -0.01  -0.02 
Thailand 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.02 (0.04) -0.02 -0.04  -0.02  -0.01 
Rest of Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 (0.06) -0.01 -0.06  0.00 -0.01 
Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.01 (0.07) 0.00 -0.03  0.00 0.00
Central America and the Caribbean (CAC) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 -0.01  0.00 0.00
South America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 -0.03  0.00 0.00
Morocco 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 -0.00  0.00 0.00
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Total 0.02 2.82 20.27 23.10Table 7b.  U.S.-Australia FTA: Percent Change in Exports, Imports, Outputs, and Number of Workers
(Percent, Millions of Dollars, and the Number of Workers)
Exports Imports Output Employment
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
U.S. Australia U.S. Australia U.S. Australia U.S. Australia
Agriculture 0.06 -1.20  0.05 2.90 0.00 -0.06  0.00 -0.07 
Mining 0.19 -3.15 -0.04  2.20 0.12 -2.19  0.08 -1.87 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.18 2.52 0.77 3.19 -0.02  0.77 -0.04  0.26
Textiles 0.58 1.73 0.05 2.52 0.13 0.06 0.09 -0.62 
Wearing Apparel 0.49 4.07 -0.09  1.81 0.11 0.55 0.08 -0.35 
Leather Products & Footwear 0.49 -0.11 -0.04  1.41 0.23 -0.33  0.21 -0.99 
Wood & Wood Products 0.26 -0.88 -0.04  3.01 0.03 0.20 0.02 -0.30 
Chemicals 0.37 -1.27 -0.06  3.76 0.08 -1.10  0.06 -1.43 
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.51 -0.82 -0.06  4.90 0.09 -0.47  0.08 -0.92 
Metal Products 0.26 -2.36 -0.05  3.14 0.09 -1.30  0.06 -1.54 
Transportation Equipment 0.32 -0.12 -0.06  3.68 0.11 -0.67  0.08 -1.25 
Machinery & Equipment 0.28 -0.96 -0.06  2.11 0.13 -1.78  0.11 -2.34 
Other Manufactures 0.35 -2.34 -0.08  2.45 0.15 -2.14  0.13 -2.44 
Elec., Gas & Water 0.09 -2.01 -0.04  2.26 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.10 
Construction 0.07 0.05 -0.01  2.05 0.01 0.31 0.00 -0.10 
Trade & Transport 0.04 15.69 1.70 0.17 -0.02  1.64 -0.03  0.43
Other Private Services 0.04 11.62 1.17 1.15 -0.01  0.94 -0.01  0.26
Government Services 0.76 13.70 1.50 27.77 0.01 0.41 0.00 -0.08 
Exports Imports Output Employment
(Value) (Value) (Value) (Number of Workers)
a
U.S. Australia U.S. Australia U.S. Australia U.S. Australia
Agriculture 31 (124) 11 25 8 (16) 94 (300)
Mining 16 (520) (31) 77 140 (585) 504 (1,390)
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 87 273 317 95 (89) 266 (756) 564
Textiles 89 34 13 73 141 4 810 (244)
Wearing Apparel 44 14 (42) 39 101 19 619 (145)
Leather Products & Footwear 15 (1) (11) 16 28 (4) 207 (121)
Wood & Wood Products 97 (15) (20) 120 166 48 394 (648)
Chemicals 434 (56) (55) 413 621 (282) 1,555 (1,612)
Non-metallic Min. Products 79 (5) (10) 79 89 (36) 539 (437)
Metal Products 113 (307) (33) 140 392 (423) 1,957 (2,912)
Transportation Equipment 421 (4) (95) 350 561 (115) 1,741 (1,196)
Machinery & Equipment 965 (58) (231) 583 1,220 (301) 6,229 (3,490)
Other Manufactures 51 (24) (36) 47 71 (39) 653 (390)
Elec., Gas & Water 1 (1) (1) 19 71 11 5 (67)
Construction 4 0 (0) 2 100 149 (257) (599)
Trade & Transport 39 1,718 1,622 17 (517) 2,113 (11,719) 11,593
Other Private Services 39 881 885 85 (460) 1,630 (2,188) 3,160
Government Services 416 353 359 407 177 363 (398) (1,764)
Total 2,940 2,159 2,643 2,566 2,844 2,802 0 0
a) Changes in employment sum to zero because of assumption of full employment.Table 7c.  U.S.-Australia FTA: Changes in Bilateral Trade Flows (Millions of Dollars)
To
From JPN USA CAN AUS NZL EUN HKG CHN KOR SGP TWN IDN MYS PHL THA ROA CHL MEX CAC SAM MCC SAC ROW Exports
Japan JPN 0 (142) (11) 51 7 (10) 1 (1) (2) (6) (10) 8 (4) (4) (2) 1 (0) (5) (3) (3) 016 (129)
United States USA 104 0 85 2,068 14 297 18 40 44 31 29 14 17 10 13 13 7 42 17 55 1 8 14 2,940
Canada CAN 10 (44) 0 1 01 1 522311210010 (0) 02011 7
Australia AUS (352) 3,479 (21) 0 (62) (203) (55) (95) (149) (40) (97) (56) (40) (23) (32) (51) (5) (5) (1) (15) (1) (19) 1 2,159
New Zealand NZL (6) (9) (2) 32 0 (14) (1) (2) (2) (1) (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (2) (0) (0) 0 (14)
EU and EFTA EUN (14) (219) (26) 1 7 9 1 60531 (3) 41 3(2) (3) (2) 70 (14) (6) (13) 07 4 9 (17)
Hong Kong HKG (1) (16) (1) 30 (2) 0 (2) (0) (1) (1) 0 (0) (0) (0) 00 (0) (0) (0) 002 (18)
China CHN (8) (75) (5) 30 2 (17) (1) 02 (2) (1) 2 (1) (1) (1) 1 (0) (1) (2) (3) 003 (76)
Korea KOR (7) (34) (4) 19 1 (11) 1 (11) 0 (3) (3) 1 (2) (2) (1) (1) (0) (2) (2) (3) 003 (61)
Singapore SGP (3) (27) (1) 10 1 (7) (1) (1) (1) 0 (3) 1 (8) (2) (2) 00 (1) (0) (1) 002 (43)
Taiwan TWN (3) (40) (3) 13 1 (5) (0) (16) (1) (3) 01 (1) (1) (1) (1) (0) (2) (0) (1) 001 (64)
Indonesia IDN 6 (28) (2) 30 0 (20) (1) (2) 4 (1) 70 (2) 0 (1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (1) 0 (0) 1 (13)
Malaysia MYS 2 (31) (3) 11 1 (11) (1) (1) 2 (12) (0) 10 (1) (1) 1 (0) (1) (0) (1) 001 (44)
Philippines PHL (1) (18) (1) 30 (3) (0) (0) (0) (1) (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) 00 (0) (0) (0) 000 (23)
Thailand THA (4) (19) (1) 80 (5) (0) (1) (0) (5) (1) 1 (1) (1) 000 (0) (0) (0) 001 (28)
Rest of Asia ROA 1 (25) (2) 18 1 (15) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) (1) (0) (1) 002 (23)
Chile CHL 4 (3) (0) 10 (0) 00100000000 (0) (0) (1) 000 2
Mexico MEX 3 (7) (1) 307001000000010120101 3
Central America and the Caribbean CAC 1 (13) 020600100000000 (0) 01000(2)
South America SAM 4 (19) (1) 81801201100011 (2) (1) 0012 9
Morocco MCC (0) (1) (0) 10 (0) 00000000000 (0) 00000(0)
Southern African Customs Union SAC 0 (5) (1) 50 (4) 1 (0) 2 (0) 10 (0) 00 (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) 001(2)
Rest of the world ROW 66 (62) (5) 63 2 (25) 2 (2) 1 9221 (0) 1 (1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (4) (1) 10
Imports (201) 2,643 (4) 2,566 (12) (22) (31) (87) (74) (43) (72) (9) (45) (27) (31) (30) 34 (2) 12 0 1 90Table 8a.  Global Welfare Effects of U.S.- Morocco FTA (Billions of U.S. Dollars and Percent)
Agricultural Protection Manufactures Tariffs Services Barriers Total Real Returns
% Bil. % Bil. % Bil. % Bil. Capital Labor
Japan 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
United States 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 0.43 0.05 5.55 0.05 5.97 0.00 0.00
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
Australia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU and EFTA 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Philippines 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Rest of Asia 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Central America and the Caribbean (CAC) 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
South America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Morocco 0.08 0.03 0.54 0.24 1.40 0.62 2.02 0.89 1.06 1.06
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 0.10 0.77 6.58 7.45Table 8b.  U.S.-Morocco FTA: Percent Change in Exports, Imports, Outputs, and Number of Workers
(Percent, Millions of Dollars, and the Number of Workers)
Exports Imports Output Employment
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
U.S. Morocco U.S. Morocco U.S. Morocco U.S. Morocco
Agriculture 0.14 0.42 0.05 6.73 0.04 -0.57  0.04 -0.57 
Mining -0.01  1.62 0.01 -0.03 -0.01  1.69 -0.01  1.09
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.38 1.66 0.03 12.53 0.03 -0.86  0.03 -1.67 
Textiles 0.03 2.11 0.01 0.45 0.00 2.02 0.00 1.30
Wearing Apparel 0.02 2.55 0.05 -0.32 -0.01  1.91 -0.02  1.24
Leather Products & Footwear 0.01 -1.04  0.01 1.43 0.00 -0.52 -0.01 -0.45 
Wood & Wood Products 0.01 1.57 0.01 0.55 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.15
Chemicals 0.00 1.46 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.05 2.53 0.01 2.23 0.01 0.58 0.00 -0.46 
Metal Products -0.01  2.26 0.01 -0.82  0.00 1.66 0.00 0.65
Transportation Equipment 0.01 1.67 0.01 1.38 0.00 0.47 0.00 -0.55 
Machinery & Equipment -0.01  2.98 0.01 -0.04 -0.01  1.94 -0.01  0.87
Other Manufactures -0.01  1.72 0.01 0.10 -0.01  0.90 -0.01  0.08
Elec., Gas & Water -0.01  0.86 0.01 -0.21  0.00 0.71 0.00 0.12
Construction -0.01  4.65 0.05 4.27 0.00 0.39 0.00 -0.12 
Trade & Transport 0.03 15.33 0.16 11.38 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.50
Other Private Services 0.04 16.82 0.11 11.47 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.09
Government Services 0.37 21.12 0.73 32.30 0.01 1.16 0.00 -0.49 
Exports Imports Output Employment
(Value) (Value) (Value) (Number of Workers)
a
U.S. Morocco U.S. Morocco U.S. Morocco U.S. Morocco
Agriculture 67 3 10 66 101 (58) 1,314 (3,124)
Mining (1) 12 12 (0) (8) 26 (44) 992
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 181 26 14 154 161 (48) 542 (9,562)
Textiles 5 12 4 8 (1) 21 (32) 5,431
Wearing Apparel 2 71 25 (1) (12) 58 (129) 8,580
Leather Products & Footwear 0 (4) 22 (0) (21) (8) (376)
Wood & Wood Products 32635 2 1 (10) 236
Chemicals (2) 21 15 2 0 49 (55) 534
Non-metallic Min. Products 82265 1 4 2 9 (995)
Metal Products (5) 41 0(6) (13) 36 (138) 889
Transportation Equipment 10 1 16 11 (5) 4 (50) (353)
Machinery & Equipment (18) 26 47 (1) (55) 42 (367) 963
Other Manufactures (1) 150 (4) 4 (52) 2
Elec., Gas & Water (0) 0007 1 02 1 1 3
Construction (1) 110 (10) 19 (57) (1,097)
Trade & Transport 32 155 149 42 (49) 165 (1,140) 13,729
Other Private Services 46 80 83 52 (42) 79 (194) 207
Government Services 202 188 175 200 98 141 389 (16,168)
Total 529 602 577 537 178 562 0 0
a) Changes in employment sum to zero because of assumption of full employment.Table 8c.  U.S.-Morocco FTA: Changes in Bilateral Trade Flows (Millions of Dollars)
To
From JPN USA CAN AUS NZL EUN HKG CHN KOR SGP TWN IDN MYS PHL THA ROA CHL MEX CAC SAM MCC SAC ROW Exports
Japan JPN 0 17 1 (0) (0) (8) (0) (0) 001 (0) 000 (1) 01 (0) (0) (5) (0) 06
United States USA (12) 0 (7) (3) (1) (63) (2) (4) (5) (4) (4) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (1) (4) (3) (9) 658 (1) 1 529
Canada CAN (1) 13 0 (0) (0) (4) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 00 (0) (0) (2) 00 5
Australia AUS 0100 (0) (1) 000000000 (0) 0000 (1) 00 0
New Zealand NZL 00000000000000000000 (2) 00(1)
EU and EFTA EUN 9 52 6 1 (0) 013322121100313 (78) 121 6
Hong Kong HKG 02000 (1) 00000000000000 (1) 00 1
China CHN 0 7 0 (0) (0) (6) (0) 00000000 (1) 000 (0) (2) 00(1)
Korea KOR 03000 (2) (0) 00000000 (0) 000 (0) (1) 00 1
Singapore SGP 03000 (2) 000000100 (0) 0000 (1) 00 2
Taiwan TWN 04000 (2) (0) (1) 000 (0) 000 (0) 000 (0) (1) 00(0)
Indonesia IDN 01000 (1) 000000000 (0) 0000 (0) 00 0
Malaysia MYS 03000 (1) 000100000 (0) 0000 (1) 00 2
Philippines PHL 02000 (1) 00000000000000 (0) 00 1
Thailand THA 02000 (1) 000000000 (0) 0000 (0) 00 1
Rest of Asia ROA 12000 (1) 00000000000000 (1) 00 2
Chile CHL 01000 (0) 0000000000000 (0) (0) 00(0)
Mexico MEX (0) 5000 (2) 0000000000 (0) 0 (0) (0) (1) (0) 02
Central America and the Caribbean CAC 02000 (1) 00000000000000 (2) 00(1)
South America SAM 08000 (1) 000000000 (0) 0000 (11) 00(3)
Morocco MCC 12 437 2 1 1 124 02211111190203010 6 0 2
Southern African Customs Union SAC 01000 (1) 00000000000000 (0) 00(0)
Rest of the world ROW 3 13 1 0 (0) (4) 011100000 (0) 0000 (11) 00 6
Imports 15 577 7 0 (0) 21 (1) 112102114 (0) 3 (2) (5) 537 0 4Table 9.  Computation of Welfare Effects of Bilateral FTAs, Unilateral Free Trade, and Global Free Trade (Billions of Dollars and Percent)
Bilateral Free Trade Unilateral Free Trade Global Free Trade
US-CAC Welfare United States Welfare Agricultural 
Protection
Welfare
(U.S.$) (% of GNP) (U.S.$) (% of GNP) (U.S.$) (% of GNP)
United States 17.3 0.2 United States 320.2 3.2 United States 0.4 0.0
CAC 5.3 4.4 Global 507.0 CAC 0.5 0.4
Global 15.7 CAC Welfare Australia -0.1 0.0
US-Australia Welfare (U.S.$) (% of GNP) Morocco 0.4 0.8
(U.S.$) (% of GNP) CAC 6.2 5.1 Global 53.9
United States 19.4 0.2 Global 33.7 Manufactures 
Tariffs
Welfare
Australia 5.4 1.1 Australia Welfare (U.S.$) (% of GNP)
Global 23.1 (U.S.$) (% of GNP) United States 75.7 0.8
US-Morocco Welfare Australia 4.6 0.9 CAC 7.7 6.5
(U.S.$) (% of GNP) Global 19.3 Australia 11.2 2.2
United States 6.0 0.1 Morocco Welfare Morocco 1.9 4.4
Morocco 0.9 2.0 (U.S.$) (% of GNP) Global 701.6
Global 7.5 Morocco 1.6 3.5 Services 
Barriers
Welfare
Global 11.4 (U.S.$) (% of GNP)






(U.S.$) (% of GNP)
United States 542.5 5.4
CAC 17.7 14.8
Australia 30.1 6.0
Morocco 4.8 10.9
Global 2,417.3